YEBOAH v. KRAMO
June 2, 1976
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- MENSA BOISON J
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Property and Real Estate Law
June 2, 1976
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
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JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.
This is an application by the defendant in a land case before the district court asking for an order of transfer of the action to the High Court for hearing on the ground that contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the value was ¢80.00, he fixes it at ¢4,000.00.
In a ruling on 17 May 1976 the district court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the action, resting on the fact that at an earlier proceeding on 13 May 1976 the parties had "agreed to the value as being ¢80.00."
[p.408]
Mr. Kumi for the plaintiff-respondent raises a preliminary objection to the motion, viz. that as there is a subsisting ruling, the defendant-applicant should have appealed from that decision—but not come by way of a fresh motion. The submission is resisted as I see it on two grounds:
Firstly that section 37 (2) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which gives power to the district magistrate to determine the value of such land, if the value is disputed, requires evidence to be taken. As I see it what is urged is that since no such evidence was taken the trial magistrate could not be said to have determined the value according to law. And so the applicant could come by fresh motion. The said section 37 (2) of Act 372 provides:
"37. (2) Where there is dispute as to whether or not any amount claimed or the value of any land or property in any action, cause or matter is in excess of the amount or value specified in subsection (1) of this section in relation to that action, cause or matter the District Court in question shall call evidence as to the said amount or value and if it finds that it exceeds the amount or value specified in subsection (1) it shall, subject to the powers of transfer of the Chief Justice, transfer the case to a Circuit Court or the High Court, whichever of such Courts has jurisdiction in the matter."
Although it adopted a summary procedure, the district court, in the instant case, did rule on the matter upon what it explained "as agreement by the parties as to the value being ¢80.00." It is open to question whether where admission is made by a party, not in evidence, the trial court in such circumstances could not act upon it. But that is not for decision now.
The point here is, with a subsisting ruling, I am of the opinion that the aggrieved party should first appeal against it. To come by a fresh motion, no enabling provision having been shown me, will mean confusion, in that after the High Court has ruled the ruling
AI Generated Summary
In this Ghanaian High Court judgment delivered by Mensa Boison J., a defendant in a land case sought to transfer the dispute from the District Court to the High Court, claiming the land’s value was ¢4,000 rather than the plaintiff’s ¢80 figure. The District Court had earlier asserted jurisdiction, relying on a 13 May 1976 proceeding at which the parties agreed the value was ¢80, and issued a subsisting ruling on 17 May 1976. Mr. Kumi, counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, objected that the proper course was an appeal from that ruling, not a fresh motion. The High Court agreed, emphasizing that entertaining a fresh transfer motion would cause conflicting, parallel rulings and procedural confusion. Construing section 101(1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), the court held that transfer powers operate only while a cause or matter is pending; once determined below, nothing remains to transfer. The application was dismissed with costs; arguments under section 37(2) about calling evidence on value were noted but not decided.