YAKUBU v. DOVE AND ANOTHER

JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A.

Kingsley-Nyinah J.A. [stated the facts as summarised in the headnote and continued:] In all the circumstances of the case, therefore, I would hold that negligence firmly attached to the appellant both in the careless manner of his riding, in his lack of reasonable foresight, and in the misguided reliance he placed in that invalid beckoning signal he solicited from the driver of the waiting Toyota truck, his own witness,

The driver of that stationary Toyota truck was Abdul Karim who testified as the appellant's second witness. It is a matter of no mean significance that his evidence contradicted that of the appellant in a couple of very material particulars, and weakened, therefore, the central core of the appellant's allegation of negligence against the second respondent. Testifying under cross-examination, this witness said: "It is correct that a vehicle going to turn to the right from a major road must move into the middle of the road to allow all vehicles to pass by on either side of that vehicle." (The emphasis is mine.) This accords with the proviso to regulation 44 (2) of the Road Traffic Regulations, 1970 (L.I. 675). With that knowledge firmly established in this witness, his answer to another question went a long way firstly, to exonerate the second respondent from blame for carelessness and negligence and then, furthermore, to consolidate and strengthen that disclaimer of liability for the accident urged and persisted in by the respondents. The plaintiff's second witness testified as follows: "It is correct that the Fiat car had room to pass by the nearside of my vehicle and the accident occurred on the nearside of my vehicle when the Fiat car attempted to overtake my vehicle on the nearside." (The emphasis is mine.) This materially contradicts the appellant's assertion that there was no room along the left side of the road for through vehicular passage past the stationary Toyota. That answer, to my mind, was enough to sweep away the unfavourable impression carried in paragraph (8) of the appellant's statement of claim: that the second respondent was in such unhealthy haste that, against all good sense (because there was no room), he forcibly drove past a whole line of other vehicles, then stationary behind the big Toyota truck and, thereby, endangered the appellant.

I am not aware of any rule, regulation, or law (and none has been brought to our attention here, in this present appeal), which says that if, whi