REX v. DARE

The following judgments were delivered :­BAKER, ].

This is a question of law reserved for the consideration of the West African Court of Appeal upon a case stated under section 191 of Cap. 20 of the Laws of Nigeria.

The facts of the case (which are not disputed) are that one Dada in consideration of a loan of 30s. advanced by the accused Dare, handed over to the accused his son Musa (a boy of some fourteen years) to work for him and to remain as a pawn with the accused until the said sum of 30s. was repaid.

Dare the accused was subsequently charged with an offence contrary to section 369 (3) of the Criminal Code which reads as follows :-

Any person who places or receives any person in servitude as a pledge or security for debt whether then due and owing. or to be incurred or contingent. whether under the name of a pawn or by whatever other name such person may be called or known-is guilty of slave-dealing."

Upon the trial of the accused the learned Judge who tried the case held that the boy Musa who was given in pawn was not an accomplice stating

He was not an accomplice on the ground inter alia that he was a victim ".

He states he relied on a case before the West African Court of Appeal R. v. Isaac Opesusi and Others-5th June, 1937. Subsequently before the defence was heard Counsel drew the Court's attention to a judgment in the case of R. v. Sanni LadiPo which the West African Court of Appeal decided in August 1938 and which reads as follows:-

.• In this case one of the grounds of appeal is that the learned trial Judge was wrong to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices, and we think that this ground must be upheld. The only evidence is that of the father who gave his three sons into servitude and of the three sons themselves. There is no suggestion that any of the sons went otherwise than willingly, and they were therefore, in our opinion, accomplices just as the father was. The trial Judge gave himself no warning in regard to the lack of corroboration. In fact the learned Counsel for the Crown informs us that the trial Judge did not regard the sons as accomplices. Following' the decision in R. v. Xorris (12 Cr. App. Rep. p. 156), we feel compelled to quash the convictions. The convictions and sentences are quashed and it is directed that in each case a judgment and verdict of acquittal be entered. The accused is discharged."

The learned trial Judge thereupon came to the conclusion that he was faced with two conflicting decision