REPUBLIC v. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; EX PARTE FORSON

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

On 24 March 1980, Mr. E. N. Moore, a one-time Attorney-General and Commissioner of Justice in this Republic, made an ex parte application for and on behalf of the applicant herein "praying for leave for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the judgment of the special tribunal and for such further order or orders as to this honourable court may seem fit." The judgment of the special tribunal established by section 1 of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 23), sought to be questioned was a judgment given against the applicant in a case entitled the Republic v. Bernard Aidoo Forson.

It was a judgment founded on two counts of criminal charges preferred against the applicant. The charges in the counts said to arise from the Archer Report on the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board Committee of Inquiry are:

(1) Obtaining an advantage by using his official position in the public service contrary to section 3 (1) (a) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 3), and

(2) Doing acts with intent to sabotage the economy of Ghana contrary to section 3 (1) (h) of A.F.R.C.D 3.

After what to all intents and purposes looked like a summary trial, the tribunal delivered its judgment on 4 February 1980 and in the said judgment after reviewing the case against the applicant, it found him guilty, convicted him accordingly and sentenced him to a term of three years penal labour on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. It is the said judgment of the special tribunal which the applicant by his counsel is seeking to have quashed by praying in aid the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court by means of the remedy of certiorari.

As I said at the commencement of this ruling, the ex parte application was made on 24 March 1980 and in granting leave, I intimated to counsel that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1978] G.L.R. 212 may create some difficulties and I would wish to hear arguments at the proper time.

The single argument advanced at the hearing of the application for leave was that the special tribunal did not at any stage of its proceedings follow the procedure for criminal trials specifically laid down for it in the enabling enactment creating the tribunal, namely, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23). The