REPUBLIC v. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE IBRAHIM ALIAS TELLEY

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

I have had considerable difficulty with this case involving as it does in my opinion a novel constitutional issue of great complexity. In exercise of resolving the matter I had great assistance in the able and painstaking argument of counsel on both sides. The central issue itself is quite simple. On 9 December 1975, the applicant herein through his counsel moved this court ex parte for leave to apply for an order of habeas corpus directed to the Inspector-General of Police and the Director of of Prisons to show cause why he, the said applicant held in alleged unlawful detention at the Nsawam Medium Security Prisons since 5 December 1975, should not be released from custody. The application came before me on 10 December 1975. After a series of adjournments the application was heard on 15 December 1975 and on that date I granted leave to the applicant to apply for the order of habeas corpus.

The applicant on the same day filed his motion paper and supporting affidavit and these documents together with the ex parte motion paper, the supporting affidavit and an order granting leave were served on the Inspector-General of Police and the Director of Prisons. The hearing was fixed for 22 December 1975 and was on that date adjourned to 23 December 1975 as the respondents, the Inspector-General of Police and the Director of Prisons did not appear nor were they represented by counsel. On 23 December 1975, there was still no representation and so in view of the Christmas holidays the case was adjourned to 7 January 1976. On 7 January 1976 a state attorney appeared for the Inspector-General of Police and the Director of Prisons, and on his application the case was adjourned to 9 January 1976 presumably to enable him to obtain instructions. On the adjourned date, however, the state attorney withdrew from [p.11] the case on the grounds that he was unable to obtain instructions from the respondents.

In a ruling which I delivered on 7 January 1976, I deprecated the dilatory and unsatisfactory nature of representation in this case. I find the situation disturbing indeed because all the documents served on the Inspector-General of Police were, on the instructions of the Inspector-General of Police, returned to the court by a letter dated 24 December 1975 with a request for a new date on the grounds that they were received too late for any action to be taken. In my ruling of 9 January 1976 I said as follows:

"I do not understand why the Inspector