REGINA v. GRUNSHIE

At the close of the arguments on the 27th February last, we allowed this appeal. We now give our reasons.

The appellant was convicted by Murphy J., sitting with assessors at Assizes holden at Kumasi, of the offence of manslaughter, and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment with hard labour. At the trial, the sole defence set up by the appellant was that, in inflicting the wounds that caused the death of the deceased, he acted in self-defence.

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Each of the three assessors accepted the defence and expressed the opinion that the prisoner was not guilty. The learned trial-Judge, however, did not conform with the opinion of the assessors, as he was of the opinion that the appellant's "actions were a form of revenge, and went a great deal farther than was necessary in self-defence, having regard to the fact that the deceased was on the ground, and to the number of wounds inflicted."

As opposed to provocation (which is a plea in mitigation) self-defence is a plea of justification, implying that the prisoner is presumed to intend the consequences, even to the extent of causing death in order to save himself from being murdered by the deceased. It is our opinion that the question of revenge, or a consideration of the degree or quantum of force used, cannot arise where the facts (as in this case) come within the provisions, of section 63(4) of the Criminal Code as to self-defence. Under those provisions there is no limit to the force or harm that may be used in necessary self-defence against murder, though under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of that section there is a limit in each case to the force that may be used, or harm inflicted, in self-defence in the instances enumerated. The learned trial-Judge appears to have misdirected himself in applying to this case the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), instead of those of sub-section 4.

(His lordship read the subsection, and proceeded):- In any case, the question that had to be decided was whether the act done was in necessary self-defence, and not whether it went farther than was necessary in self-defence. Homicide is justifiable as soon as the act done is found to be in necessary self-defence. In the present case, it does appear to us that the learned Judge had no doubt that the act was in fact done in a case of extreme necessity, and in necessary self-defence.

As the whole appeal is concerned with a question of law, it is unnecessary to state the facts in any details. It is suffici