R. v. SARPONG

This appeal was the third case of its kind to come before this Court within a period of two weeks.

In each case the record disclosed a failure on the part of a Commissioner of Assize sitting with the aid of assessors to observe the statutory directions given to all Judges in such cases by the provisions of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The section reads as follows:-

"300 (1) When, in a case tried with assessors, the case on both sides is closed, the Judge may sum up the evidence for the prosecution and the defence, and shall then require each of the assessors to state his opinion orally, and shall record such opinion.

(2) The Judge shall then give judgment and in so doing shall not be bound to conform with the opinion of the assessors, but he shall record his judgment in writing and in every case such judgment shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision, and shall be dated and signed by the Judge at the time of pronouncing it.

(3) If the accused person is convicted, the Judge shall pass sentence on him according to law."

The language could not possibly be in plainer or more mandatory terms. In a jury case, when a Judge sums up, it is his duty, according to the decided cases, to marshal and sift the whole of the evidence, so that it is presented to the jury in such a form as will enable them to bring to its consideration in the course of their deliberations clear, [p.385] well-informed and analytical minds. It is not less essential, in a case where a Judge sits with the aid of assessors (and he is so required by the Statute, whether he sums up to the assessors or not) that he should give a judgment in writing, from which it will appear to all who read it that he has, in arriving at his own verdict, instructed himself as fully as his duty would require him to instruct a jury, if he had in fact been sitting with a jury.

We strongly express our hope that what happened in the present case (which cannot, as we have earlier indicated, be regarded as exceptional) will never occur again.

The appellant was charged upon three counts, one of burglary and two of stealing from a dwelling house. The articles involved in the alleged thefts were of a total value of £788, and amongst them were 3 gold necklaces, 6 pairs of gold earrings and 7 gold rings and beads. The appellant, when he was arrested, was found in possession of one necklace and two gold bangles, and these were claimed by a p