QUAGRAINE v. DAVIES

Lord Guest delivered the judgment of their Lordships. The question raised in this appeal is a purely procedural point, whether an appeal by the appellants to the Court of Appeal, Ghana was timeous. But in order to appreciate the point it is necessary to rehearse briefly the circumstances under which it arises.

The history starts with a Privy Council judgment in 1929, in a litigation between a caretaker on behalf of the present respondent in regard to the title to Agissu land. The Board decided in favour of the appellant but no declaration of title was made. On the 14th October, 1948, the appellant issued a summons for a claim in trespass for recovery of possession of the Agissu land relying on the judgment of the Privy Council. In 1956, the case was still pending in the native court and it was thereafter transferred to the Land Court. In the statement of claim the plaintiff claimed recovery of possession of the Agissu land relying on the Privy Council judgment and alleging that the respondent was estopped from claiming ownership of the Agissu land. The respondent in his defence denied that he was occupying Agissu land. The Land which he occupied consisted of three parcels of land known as Nanado, Abberzaboasie and Abiswa. A dispute was thus disclosed as to the boundaries of the Agissu land and respondent’s land.

After evidence Acolatse, J., on the 21st December, 1957, gave judgment in favour of the respondent. The appellant on the 4th January, 1958, gave notice of motion under Order 39 of the Rules of the High Court of Ghana for review of the judgment of Acolatse, J. Affidavits were lodged in support of this motion and on 8th March, 1958, the judge made an order which concluded with these words: “This motion is allowed to the extent of the order above”. The order will be more fully referred to later. Thereafter evidence was taken by the judge and on 31st October, 1959, the judge gave a ruling dismissing the review . An appeal was tabled on 3rd November, 1959 and on 13th June, 1960, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had not been timeously taken. By Rule 9 of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules, 1957 an appeal against a final decision must be taken within three months.

When a case is reheard on review, the order on the rehearing is a new decree and the time for appealing runs from the date of the order. The question which sharply arises is thus whether the "ruling" of the 31st October, 1959, is an order on the rehearing.