Owusu and Another v. Anane and Others

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC.

This appeal comes to us by leave granted by Nananom of the chieftaincy committee of the National House of Chiefs. The appellants admit that they have consistently lost in all the hierarchy of the chieftaincy tribunals. But they contend in their statement of case that by their notice of appeal filed in this court, their said notice contains:

“4. Original grounds of appeal and a notice that additional grounds of appeal will be filed.”

They further contend that: “The proposed additional grounds are a better statement of the grounds which the appellants desire to urge in this court and they include but also go beyond the specific original grounds of appeal.” Thus apart from the 4 original grounds of appeal the appellants put forth before us no less than seven (7) additional grounds of appeal. Interest however arises in the proceedings before the National House of Chiefs. It is settled law that an appeal emanates from the judgment of the court or tribunal whose judgment is under attack. Such a judgment is presumed correct until it is upset by the appellate tribunal or court.

Before the National House of Chiefs learned counsel for the appellants stated categorically, and was so recorded by Nananom, that he abandoned all other grounds of appeal. Upon so abandoning all his other grounds of appeal Mr A K Mmieh, learned counsel for the respondents replied: “I agree that the most important issue is whether or not the 1st respondent is a royal”. The ground which learned counsel was arguing at the time when he abandoned all the other grounds of appeal was “whether the 1st respondent is of Agona clan to seek election. The appellants say he is Ekona the respondents say he is an Agona.”

Having so narrowed the issue for determination to the “sole grounds of lineage” Nananom were in full grasp of the arguments advanced by counsel and the majority of them had no difficulty in finding for the respondents and dismissing the appeal. The National House of Chiefs gave three cogent reasons (citing as it were page and line) from the record of appeal in support of their judgment.

In our opinion the minority judgment exhibited a clear confusion of thought. In spite of the fact that counsel for the appellants had abandoned all his other grounds of appeal, the minority view was able to say that:

“The case has been fought on eligibility, and procedure and election at the tribunals of the traditional council and the Ashant