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September 4, 1963
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
On the 23rd December, 1961, the appellant filed in this court notice of appeal against the income tax assessment of his business for three years, namely, 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1955-56. On the 4th January, 1962, the respondent filed a reply to the grounds of appeal contained in the notice of appeal. Then quite unnecessarily counsel filed summons for directions on behalf of the appellant, but that was very properly struck out on the 19th February, 1962. Thereafter no notice for the hearing of the appeal was served on the parties, and on the 1st April, 1963, a writ of fi. fa. was issued at the instance of the respondent to attach the appellant's property, and upon hearing of this, the appellant filed a motion on the 23rd July, 1963, for an order for stay of execution.
When this motion came up for hearing, counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary point of law as to the jurisdiction of this court to hear the appeal and I therefore stayed the hearing of the motion and decided to hear the appeal itself on the 19th of August, 1963.
Upon the appeal coming up for hearing on the 29th August, 1963, counsel for the respondent referred to sections 1 (1) and 2 of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1962,1 which came into force on the 1st March, [p.329] 1962, and submitted as a preliminary objection that by virtue of that Act, the amount on the assessment had already become a debt which should operate as a judgment of the court, and that therefore this court cannot have jurisdiction to entertain and decide on the merit of the appeal, or alternatively that since the assessment has by this Act become a statutory debt, there is nothing for this court to adjudicate upon.
[His lordship here read the provisions of sections 1 (1) and 2 of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1962, as set out in the headnote and continued:] By the sweeping force of this new Act,2 there can be no question at all that if an appeal had not already been lodged before its coming into force the appellant would have been caught by its provisions and thereby deprived of any right of hearing. But can the sections be interpreted to apply with equal force where an appeal had already been lodged against the assessment?
In this regard it seems to me that one should have recourse to the Interpretation Act, 1960.3 Section 8 (1) (c) and (e) of the said Interpretation Act read as follows:
"8. (1) The repeal or revocation of an enactment shall not—. . .
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liabili
AI Generated Summary
The appellant challenged income tax assessments for 1952–53, 1953–54 and 1955–56 by filing a notice of appeal on 23 December 1961. After a reply by the respondent and intervening enforcement steps (including a writ of fi.fa. and a motion for stay), the respondent argued at hearing that sections 1(1) and 2 of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1962, converted the assessments into a statutory debt and judgment, stripping the court of jurisdiction or leaving nothing to decide. Prempeh J rejected the objection, turning to the Interpretation Act, 1960—specifically sections 8(1)(c), (e) and 9(c)—and doctrinal authorities to hold that vested appeal rights and pending proceedings are preserved despite repeal or amendment. Analogizing to Lemm v. Mitchell, the court concluded the appeal was properly before it. The preliminary objection was overruled and the appeal ordered to proceed.