MRS. ELIZABETH ANOKYE v. MRS. MARGARET OSEI & ORS

R U L I N G

MRS. WOOD, C.J: In this motion, the Appellant Applicants pray for special leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal dated the 15th of April 2005 and a stay of execution of the said decision. They contend that owing to a procedural blunder, albeit on the part of their counsel- failing to obtain leave before filing their initial appeal, - and other matters relative to it, they have been disabled from filing a competent appeal within the time stipulated under the Supreme Court rules CI 16. The application is brought under Article 131 (1) (b), Article 131(2) of the Constitution and section 4 (2) of the Courts Act, Act 459 rules 7(2) and (4) of the Supreme Court Rules, CI 16. I do not think the issues raised by this application require a setting out in extenso of the various constitutional and other statutory provisions on which the application is based. The respondents do not in any event challenge their applicability. Their contention simply is that they are not entitled to this special right to appeal. In the circumstances, what we have to examine firstly is the matters that influence a grant or refusal of the order.

The legal position is that in the area of judicial discretion, where cases are dealt with purely on the merits and on a case by case basis, there can be no judicial precedent properly so called. Nonetheless, there are standard principles which guide our discretionary decision. It is these criteria which I now examine. In Dolphyne (No) 2 v Speedline [1996-97] SCGLR 373, this honourable court had opportunity to determine the general principles which should guide the court and concluded that:

“The principles-to be applied as guides-on which the Supreme Court might determine whether to grant special leave to appeal or not were:

Where there was a prima facie error on the face of the record;

or a general principle of law had arisen for the first time;

or a decision by the Supreme Court on the point sought to be appealed against would be advantageous to the public.”

I understand this last principle under (c) to be referable to not just any legal question but those novel points of law that raise substantial issues of some public importance.

Kotey v Koletey [2000] SCGLR 417 and Ansah v Atsem [2001-2002] SCGLR expanded the law further and observed that in such exercises, other factors such as public policy, the need for litigation to come to an end, the need to avoid inordinate disrespect for the rules of court and the