October 29, 2008
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court of Ghana, per R.C. Owusu J.S.C., entertained an application under Article 132 to exercise supervisory jurisdiction through certiorari and prohibition over Fast Track High Court 3 presided by P.K. Gyeasayor J. The applicants sought to quash a 10 March 2008 ruling and halt further proceedings in suit AL 109/06, which concerns Anna Victoria Mensah’s claims to leasehold ownership and challenges to attachment. The central dispute at the hearing was a preliminary objection that the supervisory application was time-barred under Rule 62’s ninety-day limit. The Court framed the key question as when the grounds first arose. After recounting events—including a default judgment on 26 October 2006, the joinder of Mary McLeod and Snowrad Ltd., and counsel’s 21 January 2008 discovery via registry search of alleged wrongful assumption of jurisdiction—the Court analogized Section 22 NRCD 54 and held the ninety-day period began upon discovery. Because the application was filed on 9 June 2008 without extension, the preliminary objection was upheld and the application struck out as incompetent.
R.C. OWUSU, J.S.C:- In an application to invoke the supervisory Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 132 of the 1992 constitution, the Applicant is praying for an order of certiorari directed to the Fast Track High Court 3, presided over by His Lordship P.K. Gyeasayor J, (as he then was) to move into this court for the purpose of quashing same the ruling of that court dated 10th March 2008 and the entire proceedings before the said court. The Applicant seeks a further order to prohibit the Respondent from further hearing suit No. AL 109/06 intituled ANNA VICTORIA MENSAH VRS. THE REGISTRAR, THE CHIEF BAILIFF and others pending before the said court.
Article 132 of the Constitution states as follows:-
1. The Supreme Court shall have supervisory Jurisdiction over all courts and over any adjudicating authority and may, in the exercise of that supervisory Jurisdiction issue orders and directions for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory power”.
At the hearing of the application, counsel for the interested party, raised a preliminary objection to the competency of the application before the court.
Counsel argued that assuming Gyeasayor J. (as he then was) had erroneously assumed jurisdiction, the application is time barred. It is his contention that the application having been brought under rules 61 and 62 of the Supreme Court Rules, C.I. 16 as amended by C.I. 24, same was brought outside the statutory Period of 90 days as required under rule 62 which reads as follows:-
“An application to invoke the supervisory Jurisdiction of the court shallbe filed within ninety days of the date when the grounds for the application first arose unless the time is extended by the court” (emphasis supplied).
Counsel therefore asked, “when did the ground for the application first arise?
To this question counsel’s answer is that Gyaesayor J. (as he then was) assumed Jurisdiction on 26/10/06 when he heard and granted the Ex-Parte. application for Judgment in default of appearance against the 1st defendant for the reliefs endorsed on the writ of summons and therefore, the ground for the application first arose on that day.
Anna Victoria Mensah, the Interested party in this application had issued a writ against the Registrar, High Court, Accra and the Chief Bailiff, Accra for:-
“(i) A declaration that by virtue of a Lease agreement entered between the plaintiff and the State Housing Corporation on the 4th of October, 2005 she is Lease Ho