GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK v. BINOO-OKAI
July 17, 1980
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Banking and Finance Law
July 17, 1980
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
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JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
This is an application for summary judgment under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), Order 14, r.1. The plaintiff is a financial institution established by statute and transacting commercial banking business throughout the country. The defendant is a customer. He was granted banking facilities in the normal course of business by the plaintiff. As at 27 September 1979, the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of ¢732,839.68. The plaintiff claims this amount plus interest calculated at the current rate from 27 September 1979 to the date of final payment.
The claim for the principal is not disputed. The defendant through counsel pleaded liable on the principal sum. He also concedes he is liable to pay interest at the current rate of eighteen and a half per cent, but it has been argued on his behalf that the plaintiff is entitled to interest only up to the date of judgment and not up to the date of final payment. Mr. A. K. Okine, counsel for the defendant, referred me to the following cases: Ryley v. Master, Sheba Gold Mining Co., Ltd. v. Trubshawe [1892] 1 Q.B. 674; Wilks v. Wood [1892] 1 Q.B. 684; London and Universal Bank v. Earl of Clancarty [1892] 1 Q.B. 689 and Lawrence and Sons v. Willcocks [1892] 1 Q.B. 696. Counsel submitted that the effect of all these cases is that judgment cannot be entered for interest which has not yet accrued. Mr. A. K. Okine contended that the interest which is to accrue after the date of judgment is not yet due so the court cannot give judgment for an amount which has not yet accrued. Interest which has not yet accrued is not a debt due and owing, so judgment cannot be entered in respect of it. He argued further that the judgment would terminate the party's [p.77] contractual right, so the plaintiff must come back and sue for whatever interest which will accrue if the debt remains unpaid after the judgment. Arguing contra, Mr Atadika submitted that this is a statutory interest, and the banker is entitled to a judgment for interest up to final payment, otherwise the ridiculous situation would be created whereby the plaintiff would bring a multiplicity of actions every six months or so to consolidate his claim for interest.
I have read and studied carefully the cases cited above and on which counsel for the defendant relies. In each of these cases, the question which the court had to determine was whether a claim for interest in each particula
AI Generated Summary
Justice Cecilia Koranteng-Addow decided a summary judgment application brought by a statutorily established commercial bank against its customer over an unpaid loan. The customer owed ¢732,839.68 and the bank sought that amount plus interest at the current rate from 27 September 1979 until final payment. The customer admitted the principal and liability for interest at eighteen and a half percent but argued interest should run only until judgment. Reviewing Order 14 as amended by LI 1129, English cases on liquidated demands, and Orders 36 r.38 and 42 r.15, the court held interest is assessable as damages only up to judgment and that upon judgment the contractual rate merges into the judgment. Post-judgment interest is four percent under Order 42, r.15 unless expressly agreed otherwise. The court entered judgment for the principal, pre-judgment interest at the bank rate, post-judgment interest at four percent, and awarded costs of ¢15,000.