Duncan-Williams v Krapah and another

LUTTERODT JA. House No 181, Kwadaso, a four-room premises, is the property of the 2nd defendant, the State Housing Corporation. The parties were at one point in time or the other tenants of the corporation, with each occupying two rooms in the said property. The plaintiff-respondent (to be hereinafter known as the “respondent”) claims that her tenancy of the portion she occupies which is described as 181B, commenced as of 1 December 1962, while the defendant-appellant (to be described hereinafter as “appellant”) was a tenant of No 181A from October 1970.

In February 1981, the 2nd defendant sold two of the said two rooms to the respondent and evidence suggests that the remaining two rooms were sold to the appellant. When her attempts to dispossess the respondent and settle her put her children in occupation failed, she instituted an action in the High Court for a number of reliefs, the principal one being: “A declaration that plaintiff is the sole lessee of estate house No 181.”

Not satisfied with the circumstances under which the entire premises came to be sold to the respondent, the appellant not only filed a defence alleging fraud, but counterclaimed inter alia for “a declaration that the purported sale of house No 181A and the consequent lease made thereon was null and void on the ground of fraud.”

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent, prompting the appellant to lodge this appeal against the decision on a number of grounds. Ground 4 of the additional grounds of appeal reads:

“That the 2nd defendants by allocating Kwadaso Estate House No 181A to the 1st defendant as evinced by their letter of 9 October 1970 (exhibit 2) and without just cause selling the same house to plaintiff respondent having regard to their letter of 17 October 1977 (exhibit 3) acted wrongfully, contrary to State Houses (Allocation Policy and Implementation) Commission Law 1984 (PNDCL 83).”

It was submitted with respect to this ground of appeal that the premises in dispute was made up of two units – 181A and 181B; and consequently the sale of both units to the respondent amounted to a sale of two houses, an act which was clearly forbidden under the provisions of the State Houses (Allocation Policy and Implementation) Commission Law 1984 (PNDCL 83). Counsel’s contention then is that the combined effect of sections 3 and 7 of the above Law completely nullifies the sale and the same ought to be set aside. Counsel for the respondents a