DJAN v. OWOO AND ANOTHER

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.

The plaintiff in this case is seeking an order for specific performance against the first defendant as a result of an agreement made on 10 January 1975 for the sale by the first defendant to the plaintiff of a house known as house No. 2, West Loop, Tesano, Accra. There are other reliefs which are not relevant for the purposes of the present application filed by the plaintiff on 25 February 1976, under Order 25, rr. 2—4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A).

It is the view of the plaintiff that the determination of the two matters raised in the application will dispose of the case in his favour. The two matters raised are, namely: (a) whether the two receipts exhibited are sufficient memoranda to decree specific performance of the land in dispute, and (b) whether specific performance can be decreed on the ground of part-performance.

[p.403]

The two receipts are dated 10 January 1975 and 27 January 1975 for the amounts of ¢2,000.00 and ¢500.00 respectively. These sums were part payments of the purchase price the plaintiff made to the defendant in respect of the house in question which the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff.

Counsel for the plaintiff in his argument relied on section 2 of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 175), which states that:

"2. No contract for the transfer of an interest in land shall be enforceable unless —

(a) it is evidenced in a writing signed by the person against whom the contract is to be proved or by a person who was authorised to sign on behalf of such person; or

(b) it is relieved against the need for such a writing by the provisions of section 3."

In fact counsel's contention is based on section 2 (a) and it is that since the receipts were signed by the defendant and the description of the property agreed to be sold has been stated in the receipts together with admission by the defendant in his statement of defence as regards the purchase price of ¢25,000.00, there was compliance with section 2 (a) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 175). In his opinion the plaintiff's case has been made out for the court to decree specific performance of the contract against the first defendant.

There cannot, in my view, be a completed contract in terms of section 2 (a) of N.R.C.D. 175 unless the contract in writing gives (i) the names of the parties, (ii) the property to be transferred, (iii) the purchase price of the property, and lastly (iv) the defendant must ha