DEI v. PONG

JUDGMENT OF MURPHY J.

(His Lordship stated the facts and proceeded): -

I do not consider there is any substance in the submission that this action, being one for slander, should have filed because there was no proof of special damage. Under section 9(a) of the Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance native courts are charged to administer native law and custom. They can scarcely be expected to understand, [p.136] let alone to administer, the intricacies of the English law of defamation. Other things being equal, in my view no objection could be taken to the Court's awarding a small sum to the plaintiff to compensate him for injury to his reputation.

However, this case must be considered in the light of what was in fact said by the defendant, and of the circumstances in which the words were spoken. In parenthesis, I would say that I find it difficult to see how the words complained of could be said to be defamatory.

But a more important consideration is that the words complained of were words spoken in the course of a judicial proceeding. As I have already indicated, one cannot apply English law to this matter, but under section 87(1) of the Courts Ordinance one must be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It does not seem to me to be in accordance with these principles that an accused person should lay himself open to a civil action by reason of his taking an objection of this kind at his trial. Admittedly there must be limits to what the accused can properly say in such circumstances. But, if these limits are exceeded, sections 17 and 18 of the Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance, which deal respectively with contempt of court and false evidence, make adequate provision for dealing with such a case.

DECISION

For these reasons I allow the appeal, set aside the judgments of both the lower courts, and enter judgment for the defendant. The appellant is allowed his taxed costs in all three courts, with five guineas allowed for counsel in this Court.