BUZU AND ANOTHER v. NUHO

JUDGMENT OF QUASHIE-SAM J.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for title to a coconut plantation and damages for trespass. On 1 April 1975 the District Court Grade II, Prestea, gave judgment for the plaintiff. On 9 April 1975 a notice of appeal was filed which gave notice that the defendants being dissatisfied with the decision of the District Court Grade II, Prestea, contained in the judgment of Mr. S. S. Adani and dated 1 April 1975 intended to appeal to the High Court, Sekondi. This notice of appeal was marked and thumbprinted by only the second defendant under whose execution were inscribed the words: "for and on behalf of the first defendant or appellant."

When the appeal came to be heard on 10 December 1975, learned counsel for the plaintiff, referring to the notice of intention to appeal, observed that both defendants as intending appellants should have signed the notice of appeal. He submitted, as a preliminary objection, that the second defendant, Nuho Zabrama, having alone signed or thumbprinted it, he, in law, must be regarded as the only appellant as in law he cannot purport to sign for the other intended appellant. He further submitted that that being the position, the additional grounds of appeal filed by counsel and designated "for the defendants/appellants" must be deemed in law to be on behalf of the second defendant, Nuho Zabrama, as the only appellant in the case. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on three cases for his preliminary objection, namely, (1) Yegbor v. Dorgah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 42; (Frimpong v. Poku [1963] 2 G.L.R. 1, S.C. and (3) Muffat v. Kpeshie II (1952) 14 W.A.C.A 44.

In reply, learned counsel for the defendants argued that there is nothing under Order 58, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which prohibits one appellant alone signing a notice of appeal on behalf of himself and a co-appellant with whom the former has a common interest in a case. He contended that in this instant case, the notice of appeal clearly shows that the appeal was lodged by both defendants and that the signature of any one of the defendants is enough to authenticate the notice of appeal on behalf of the other defendant who did not sign it.

In the Yegbor case (supra) cited by learned counsel for the plaintiff the appeal was purported to have been brought under the then Native Courts [p.359] (Southern Section of Togoland) Ordinance, Cap. 106 (1951 Rev.), and regulation 118 (1) and (2) of the Native Courts (