BUDU II v. CAESAR AND OTHERS

JUDGMENT OF KORSAH, C.J.

During the trial of this case in the Land Court, counsel for plaintiff intimated that the learned judge presiding at the trial, had, prior to his elevation to the High Court Bench,

"written a letter as solicitor for the fourth defendant, Ocansey, to the Clerk of mid-Volta Local Council, Senchi, in connection with the tolls in respect of the land which the fourth defendant claims in this suit."

Counsel, however, further stated that he was not objecting to the learned judge hearing the case.

Later, at the close of the evidence of plaintiff's fifth witness, counsel repeated the above statement, and specially mentioned a letter dated the 8th October, 1941, as the letter to which he had previously referred, and added that because of that letter his client objected to the learned judge hearing the case. The letter which was admitted in evidence and marked exhibit LC reads thus:

"Dear Sir,

C. Tetteh Cuonooh .. Plaintiff

versus

Nana Kofi Budu .. Defendant

R.M. Asare .. Claimant

[p.177]

I have the honour to apply for withdrawal of the sum of six pounds nine shillings and six pence (£6 9s. 6d) being costs deposited in the above case."

The learned judge overruled the objection on the ground, with which we agree, that writing such a letter on behalf of a person who was not a party in that case could not in any way disqualify him from hearing this case, though that person is now a party in the proceedings before him. He rightly, therefore, ordered the case to proceed.

In the course of the evidence of the sixth witness for the plaintiff, counsel again protested against the learned judge hearing the case, because the letter (exhibit LC) refers to an interpleader suit which formed part of the plaintiff's case and that exhibit LC shows that the learned judge had foreknowledge of the facts which are reasonably likely to influence or bias his mind. After listening to a long dissertation by counsel the learned judge rightly ordered that the case should proceed.

In our view there is nothing on record, which by any stretch of imagination can be deemed to be sufficient to disqualify the learned judge on grounds of legal bias from presiding at the hearing of this case. But it would appear that by this time counsel's behaviour in court had become provocative to such an extent that it caused the learned judge to devote a considerable portion of his judgment to describing this provocative and hostile attitude to the bench, and to make the lea