BOATENG AND ANOTHER v. THE REPUBLIC

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.

This is an application to admit the third and fourth accused to bail pending their trial before the Circuit Court, Sunyani. The four accused persons are standing trial: the first, second and third accused for conspiracy to horn cocoa, and horning cocoa, contrary to section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and section 1 (c) of the Cocoa Industry and Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 63), and stealing cocoa, together with the fourth accused for conspiracy to steal and stealing cocoa contrary to sections 23 (1) and 124 of Act 29.

All the four accused had been on bail since their first appearance [p.446] before the court on 3 March 1976. On 29 April 1976, when the case again came on for hearing, the first accused failed to appear having jumped bail. The bail of the second, third and fourth accused were then rescinded. It is in substance urged that it was not sufficiently good reason for the court to rescind the bail of these others because the first accused had jumped bail. The Republic resists the application; and beside the merits, I shall first deal with a point of jurisdiction raised by Mr. Agbanu, senior state attorney. Unfortunately the point was first raised in his submissions in reply to that of counsel for the appellants, and so I had not the benefit of any argument from learned counsel for the applicants.

The point raised was that besides section 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D.309), s.2 the courts have no other power to grant bail. Consequently this being an application for bail pending trial and not on appeal from the circuit court, section 96 (2) of Act 30 is the only provision empowering this application. But he contended that as Act 30, s. 96 (2) gives concurrent jurisdiction to the circuit court as well as the High Court, the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted once the circuit court has exercised its powers under section 96 (2).

Having thus submitted what he considers to be the law governing the power of this court for the grant of bail, Mr. Agbanu in a very forceful argument set out to eliminate any powers for the grant of bail that were supposed to be provided by what remains of the Constitution, 1969. Now section 96 (2) of Act 30 provides:

"96. (2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of this section or in section 15 [of Act 30], but subject to the following provisions of