JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
Anin J.A. delivered the judgment of the Court: On 19 February 1971, the appeal of each appellant was allowed and we now give our reasons.
[p.431]
The appellants were convicted by Kingsley-Nyinah J. sitting with a jury at the Criminal Session of the High Court, Ho on 16 January 1968, of two counts each of the offence of robbery, contrary to section 149 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) (No. 3) Act, 1963 (Act 157), section 3. The first and second appellants were each sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment with hard labour on each count, the sentences to run concurrently; and the third appellant was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment with hard labour on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
The gist of the prosecution case was that on the day in question the appellants waylaid one Gabriel Kwaovi Torsavi, a bread seller, as he plied along the Ziome-Akpokploe road on his bicycle; threatened him with violence; stole from his person his Ghana and French money totalling £G17 or N¢40.80; and robbed him at the same time of his said bicycle. The prosecution called six witnesses to testify in support of their case and to show that the appellants confessed to the crime alleged against them, both before the said witnesses and in their cautioned statements to the police.
At the close of the prosecution case, the learned judge ruled that there was a prima facie case for each accused person to answer. The accused persons, who were unrepresented at the trial, elected to give evidence on their own behalf. Each accused person vehemently denied the charges preferred against him and denied having made the confession attributed to him. After the learned judge's summing-up, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty against each accused person on both counts and the court imposed the said sentences on the accused persons. From their convictions and sentences, they have now appealed to this court. They were unrepresented by counsel.
From our own perusal of the record of proceedings, we noticed a fatal procedural flaw which occurred in the course of the cross-examination of the third accused (Nicholas Kofi) on 20 December 1967 and which warranted the appeal of each appellant being allowed. The procedural irregularity in question went to the root of our whole concept of a fair trial. During the cross-examination of the third accused, counsel for the prosecution applied for leave to cro
