ARMON AND ANOTHER v. KATZ

JUDGMENT OF APALOO J.A.

This appeal raises the somewhat novel but interesting questions as to what legal privileges diplomatic agents enjoy in this country and how their immunity from the domestic jurisdiction of our courts is proved. But before entering into an examination of these questions, it is well to relate the facts.

On 26 February 1967, the respondent who I shall hereinafter call the plaintiff, rode in a car driven by the first appellant (hereinafter called the first defendant). This car belonged to the second appellant (hereinafter referred to as the second defendant). The latter is the father of the first defendant. At a point along the Weija-Accra road, that car went into ditch and the plaintiff suffered injuries. Both the plaintiff and the first defendant are infants according to the laws of this country. The plaintiff was then seventeen-and-a-half years of age and the first defendant was half-a-year her senior, he being eighteen years old.

On 18 May 1967, the plaintiff through her next friend Hanan Katz, caused to be issued against both defendants a writ claiming "damages for injuries and loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligence of the first defendant the servant and/or agent of the second defendant." To the writ, was attached a statement of claim. That statement shows that the infant defendant was sued per his mother, Mrs. Shalomo Armon, who was described as "his next friend." Although nothing on this case turned on this, perhaps I should point out that while an infant sues by his next friend, he defends an action by his guardian ad litem.

The record shows that the writs were served on both defendants on the date of issue, namely, 18 May. On 29 May 1967 both defendants entered conditional appearance "without prejudice to an application ... [p.118] to set aside the writ of summons . . . for want of jurisdiction on the grounds of diplomatic immunity."

Paragraph (6) of the statement of claim averred negligent driving against the first defendant but no particulars of it were given. There were, however, particulars of injuries and special damages alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. Apart from the absence of the particulars of negligence, the plaintiff's pleading contains one peculiarity. The second defendant seems to have insured the car in obedience to the requirements of section 3 of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act, 1958 (No. 42 of 1958). Although no relief was sought against the insurers in