ARMAH v. GHANA WATER AND SEWERAGE CORPORATION

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

The plaintiff, an Accra legal practitioner, is the landlord of a block of flats described as house No. 3 Block 9, North Odorkor Residential Area. By a tenancy agreement dated 20 November 1978, he let these premises to the defendants, the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, at an annual rent of ¢27,000 for two years certain with an option to renew. The notice of intention to renew should be given three months prior to the expiry of the term. The lease commenced on 1 September 1978, and the yearly rent was payable in advance at the commencement of each term. From 1 September 1979, the defendants failed to pay the agreed rent of ¢27,000. The plaintiff therefore took out this summons for recovery of possession; ¢13,500 arrears of rent for six unspecified months, and mesne profits.

[p.816]

By their amended statement of defence, the defendants pleaded and relied on two documents, namely, a circular No. 16/Vol. 3/143, dated 21 August 1979, issued from the office of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and signed by E. K. Minta, Secretary to the Council at the time; and circular No. SCR — 01/2 dated 19 July 1979, issued from the same office. Those circulars issued directives to all government organisations, statutory boards and corporations to reduce rents paid from public funds, in respect of public officers occupying private houses by fifty per centum.

The defendants contend that by virtue of these directives, they were enjoined to pay the plaintiff half of the rent agreed upon between them in the agreement. They contend further that the plaintiff's action is misconceived because it is contrary to the basic law of the land. They pleaded the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, and maintain that the directive, being a decision of the A.F.R.C. cannot be challenged or questioned by any "proceedings whatsoever."

Counsel on both sides agreed that from the pleadings, no issue needed to be resolved on the facts; the only issue that falls to be decided is one of question of law, namely, whether the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council's directive was an executive action within the context of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. They agreed that the matter could be disposed of by legal argument.

I decided that the burden in this issue was thrown on the defendants, so they had the right to begin. Mr. Duose, arguing on behalf of the defendants, submitted that the defendant-corporation is a qua