AKWEI v. AKWEI

JUDGMENT OF OLLENNU J.

[His lordship stated the facts and continued:] The grounds for the review is that the judgment of Acolatse J. delivered on the 20th April, 1959, had declared that the applicant Isaac Akwei was the owner of the property immediately prior to the sale, and therefore the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to arbitrate on the ownership of the property after the judgment of the court, and in any event, that the applicant, not being a party to the suit herein, the arbitrators and consequently this court are not entitled to make an order in respect of the property which affects the rights of the applicant Isaac Akwei in the property.

The submission is misconceived. In the first place, if the applicant was the individual owner of the house immediately prior to its sale, then upon the sale the validity of which he maintained, the whole of his right, title and interest in it passed to plaintiff; he has no longer any interest in the said property. He is therefore estopped by reason of the said judgment of Acolatse,J. from now asserting any interest whatsoever in the house. All that remained to him after the sale, was the difference between the purchase price of £466 and the £16 0s. 2d. the amount of rates due and for which the house was sold, and this he must have collected already from the court whence the execution issued.

Again by reason of the judgment of Acolatse,J. upon which the applicant relies, the plaintiff Alexandra Akwei was the owner of the house at the date the present suit was instituted; as such owner she is entitled, in spite of that judgment, to submit the dispute to arbitration and she is in law, bound by the award of that arbitration.

If after a court of competent jurisdiction had adjudicated upon a dispute between parties, the parties voluntarily submitted the dispute in respect of the same subject-matter to arbitration, they will be estopped from claiming the fruits or benefits of the said judgment of the court, and would be bound by the award of the arbitration held subsequent to that judgment. In the case of Yardom v. Minta III a consent order was entered by the High Court in a suit between the parties on a boundary dispute. Some time after that the parties submitted a dispute between them in respect of the same boundary to arbitration held in accordance with customary law. Later they again submitted a further dispute to arbitration. [p.214] The plaintiff then sued in the High Court to enforce the second award and ob