ABAKAH AND OTHERS v. AMBRADU
May 20, 1963
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- VAN LARE
- MILLS-ODOI
- AKUFO-ADDO JJ.S.C
Areas of Law
- Family Law
- Civil Procedure
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT OF MILLS-ODOI J.S.C.
[His lordship recited the facts and continued:] It is in pursuance of the alleged removal of the defendant from office as head of family and of his refusal to deliver to the family the properties under his control that this action was brought by the first plaintiff in his capacity as head of family and the other plaintiffs as elders of the said family claiming against the defendant an order for:
"(i) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants or agents from collecting any further rents from tenants living in houses Nos. 39/12, 40/12, 34/13, Sixth Street, Sekondi, or interfering in any way with the management and control of the houses specified and any other property or the Ewan Kweku Anona family.
(ii) Delivery to first plaintiff, the newly elected head of the said family, of the following:
(a) All documents of title in respect of the said three houses together with the building plans of same and in particular the agreement of lease executed between the family and U.A.C. Ltd., in respect of house No. 39/12, Sixth Street, Sekondi.
(b) The bank book and all books of account belonging to the family."
[p.458]
In his statement of defence the defendant contended that "he is still the recognised head of the family . . . and that none of the alleged customary charges . . . have been or could be proved against him."
The main point therefore that fell for determination in the trial was whether the defendant who was the head of Ewan Kweku Anona family had been removed from office at a family meeting held on the 16th July, 1961, properly constituted for that purpose. The learned trial judge dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on the ground, inter alia, that the family meeting which was held on the 16th July, 1961, purporting to depose the defendant as head of the family was not properly constituted in accordance with custom. He followed the principle in the case of Lartey v. Mensah1 and gave judgment for the defendant. It is from that judgment that the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.
The main ground of appeal argued by learned counsel for the appellants in this court is that:
"The passage of the judgment quoted from Lartey v. Mensah 3 W.A.L.R. 410 deals with notices convening a family meeting for the purpose of appointing or electing a new head of family. That principle of customary law will not necessarily apply to all cases where a head of family is to be deposed for misconduct and gross mismanagement