JP v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error in point of law as respects the Crows Nest variation (as explained in the Reasons section below). However, the error was not material, as it did not affect the child support maintenance payable. I therefore decline to set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. In what follows I also refuse two applications of the Appellant, as explained more fully below. REASONS FOR DECISION

g. the “ SoS ” are to the first respondent.

The appeal to, and decision of, the FTT

b. regulation 69 unearned income of £24,196 from Father’s Assetz account – to which I will refer as the “ Assetz variation ”.

The grant of limited permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal

The Upper Tribunal on 13 January 2025 issued my decision (the “ permission decision ”) giving permission to appeal limited to an error of law in respect of the Crows Nest variation. The permission decision noted that the FTT found that the Crows Nest property was owned jointly by Father and his wife ([71, 74]); that Father had a 50% interest ([23]); and that Father’s wife was running Crows Nest as a holiday let on a day-to-day basis with minimal involvement from Father ([23]). The FTT recorded Father’s evidence that the income received from the holiday let business was split 95% to his wife and 5% to him ([77]). The permission decision went on to say this: “16. It seems to me that the FTT decision did not expressly address the question of whether Father’s 50% interest in Crows Nest was being used in the course of a trade or business of Father’s; but it seems reasonably arguable that the inference could be made from the factual findings that the FTT decision did make, that the Crows Nest property was being used for a business (the holiday let business) and that business was in part Father’s (as he took 5% of the income received). It therefore seems to me realistically arguable that the FTT decision erred in not addressing this question and/or in failing to explain, adequately, how it reached the view that Father’s 50% interest in Crows Nest was not excluded from regulation 69A(1) by reason of regulation 69A(4)(b). 17. I would add, acting inquisitorially, the following related points, which seem to me realistically arguable: a. even if there was no legal error in not excluding Father’s 50% interest in Crows Nest from regulation 69A(1) by reason of regulation 69