Baker v Rowe

Judgment

Lord Justice Wilson:

We have to unravel a tangled situation in relation to orders for costs as between interveners in proceedings for ancillary relief following divorce.

There are four protagonists. The first two are Mrs Wood and Mr Wood. They are now aged 98 and 99 respectively. They were married in 1972 and Mrs Wood issued a petition for divorce in 2008. Although the decree nisi granted to her has probably now been made absolute, it will be convenient for me to call Mrs Wood “the wife” and Mr Wood “the husband”. The third protagonist is Mrs Rowe. She is the daughter of the wife by a marriage prior to her marriage to the husband. Although therefore Mrs Rowe is not the husband’s daughter, it will be convenient to describe her as “the daughter”. The fourth protagonist is Mr Baker. He was married to the daughter between 1988 and 1996. Although therefore Mr Baker was never the son-in-law of the husband and although his divorce from the daughter means that he is no longer the son-in-law even of the wife, it will be convenient to describe him as “the son-in-law”.

The son-in-law applies for permission to appeal against an order made by His Honour Judge Vincent in the Truro County Court on 22 January 2009. The hearing of his application was arranged as a hearing on notice to the daughter and on the basis that, were permission granted, the substantive appeal would be determined forthwith. Neither the wife nor the husband takes any part in the proceedings in this court.

Subject to errors on his part to which I will refer in [5] below, I can broadly say that on 22 January 2009 the circuit judge determined an appeal brought by the son-in-law against an order for costs made against him in favour of the daughter by District Judge Mitchell on 19 November 2008 following the intervention of each of them in proceedings for ancillary relief between the wife and the husband. Subject to those same errors, I can broadly say that the circuit judge dismissed the son-in-law’s appeal. The son-in-law aspires to appeal to this court against the dismissal of his appeal.

The errors to which I have referred arises from the conjunction of:

the circuit judge’s statement that the son-in-law needed permission to appeal to him;

the circuit judge’s observation that, had he considered the issue of permission to appeal as a discrete matter, he would have granted it; and

the circuit judge’s orders, both as announced at the end of his judgment and as drawn, to the effect not