UNITED AFRICA CO., LTD. v. MBRA v. AND ANOTHER
1960
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
- KORSAH, C.J.
- VAN LARE, J.A.
- GRANVILLE SHARP, J.A
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
1960
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This case involves an appeal regarding the interpretation of section 72 subsections (1) and (5) of the Municipal Councils Ordinance No. 9 of 1953. The main issues concern the collection of revenues from stool land within the Cape Coast Municipal area. The court held that the rent should be collected by the Cape Coast Municipal Council from the lessee, starting from the date when the council was established. The court emphasized that the key word in interpreting the relevant section is "receivable", not "disposal". This means that any revenues from stool lands, regardless of when the lease was executed, should be treated as revenues within the meaning of the Ordinance, as long as the rents accrue and become payable on or after the council's establishment date. The court also affirmed the principle that a lease does not divest the owner of their title to the leased property. The appeal was allowed, and the lower court's judgment was set aside.
Korsah C.J. delivered the judgment of the court: This is an appeal from a matter brought to the court by the United Africa Company Ltd., the lessee of stool land within the Cape Coast Municipal area, by an originating summons for the determination of certain questions relating to the interpretation of section 72 subsections (1) and (5) of the Municipal Councils Ordinance No. 9 of 1953. The questions are:
“(a) Whether the revenues from stool land within the municipal area shall be collected by the council concerned (as directed by section 72 (1) of the Ordinance) from the lessor or from the lessee of such lands.
(b) If from the lessee, as from what date is the council to collect such rent payable under a lease made prior to the establishment of the council.
(c) To whom are rents payable under the Lease of Oman Lands (a copy whereof is annexed hereto) registered as No. 667/1957 and dated 22nd March, 1954 and made between the 1st defendant of the one part and the plaintiff of the other part:
(i) in respect of the period prior to the establishment of the 2nd defendant, that is 1st July, 1954 and
(ii) in respect of the period subsequent to the establishment of the said council."
The learned judge answered these questions, in our opinion incorrectly, upon a wrong view as to the effect of the relevant section viz., subsection (5) which reads:
“For the purposes of this section revenues from Stool lands include any valuable consideration which except for the provisions of subsection (2) of this section would be receivable by the Stool on a disposal by the Stool of any interest or right in land within the municipal area on or after the day on which the Council is established."
The learned judge expressed the view that the lease in question, having been executed prior to the coming into operation of the ordinance, it was not a disposal by the stool of a right in land within the municipal area on or after the day on which the council was established, and that therefore the revenues by way of rent derivable therefrom were not revenues within the meaning of the section. By so doing, he erroneously construed the section by assuming that the operative word in subsection (5) is "disposal", and not "receivable."
In our view a proper understanding of the intendment of the Ordinance demands that this section should be construed to give emphasis to the word " receivable ", so that any revenues from stool lands, whether leased before, on or after the date when the coun