TSRIFO v. DUA VIII
1959
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- OLLENNU J
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Property and Real Estate Law
1959
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The native trial court's ruling was overturned by the Kpandu District Appeal Court, which was upheld on further appeal. The trial court based its decision on a non-existent German survey from 1905. The appeal raised issues about the correct basis for factual findings and the relative roles of trial and appellate courts in making such findings. The appeal was dismissed and costs awarded to the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF OLLENNU J.
(His lordship stated the history of the case, and proceeded;—) In their judgment the native trial-Court made the following findings of fact:
“The witnesses in this case supported plaintiff in their evidence in respect of the case heard and determined in respect of the land in dispute . Except defence witness Kwami, all of them mentioned the “Have” stream as the recognised boundary mark between both parties land which came in conjunction with the arbitration.” In other words, the native trial-Court found the plaintiff’s claim (that the Have stream is the boundary between his land and that of the defendant) confirmed by all his witnesses, and by all but one of the witnesses for the defendant.
Where the evidence of one party on an issue in a suit is corroborated by witnesses of his opponent, whilst that of his opponent on the same issue stands uncorroborated even by his own witnesses, a Court ought not to accept the uncorroborated version in preference to the corroborated one, unless for some good reason (which must [p.65] appear on the face of the judgment) the Court finds the corroborated version incredible or impossible. In this case there is nothing in the judgment which justified the native trial-Court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s evidence, which on the record was corroborated both by his own witnesses and those of the defendant.
Before delivering their judgment, the native trial-Court inspected the land in dispute and upon their return recorded their report of the inspection. On appeal, the Kpandu District Appeal Court also inspected the land, saw most of the things which the native trial-Court had seen, and they too recorded a report of what they had seen. They then drew their own inferences from the things they had seen, and upon those inferences (coupled with other facts in the case) they delivered their judgment, reversing the decision of the native-trial-Court.
Counsel for the Appellant referred the Court to a judgment of the Court of Appeal, delivered on the 29th October, 1958, confirming a judgment delivered by me on the 28th of May, 1957. In that judgment I held:
“that as the case rested mainly upon what the trial-Court saw at the inspection of the boundary, and there being nothing to indicate that the Native Appeal Court were shown something different from what the trial-Court saw, it was not open to the Native Appeal Court to interfere with the findings of fact made by the native trial-Court simply because, if