RULING ON APPLICATION FOR ADJOURNMENT

The Registrar has brought to me a letter dated 17th July, 2026 signed by Charles Boakye Esq. of Zoe, Akyea & Co., seeking an adjournment of the application for deferment of judgment and constitutional referral slated for today, 20th July, 2026, to 22nd July, 2026. The reason given is that substantive counsel seized with the conduct of this matter is currently out of jurisdiction on prior personal engagement.

On 29th June, 2026, this Court, having granted counsel leave to file a closing address on behalf of the 1st and 3rd Accused Persons, adjourned this matter in the presence of counsel to today, 20th July, 2026.

If counsel had a prior engagement, or if the date was unsuitable, he ought to have so indicated to the Court at the time. The Court would have, in consultation with counsel on both sides, fixed another date convenient to the Court and to counsel. Lawyers owe a duty of candour to the Court. It is even more so where, as in this case, the date was fixed with the input and express consent of counsel. To now seek an adjournment on the basis of “prior personal engagement” is untenable. Today’s date was not imposed on counsel.

Counsel was present in Court and agreed to the date.

As it stands, the proposed date of 22nd July, 2026 is not convenient to the Court.

The Law on Adjournment

Before I proceed, I remind myself of the settled principles on adjournments in our jurisprudence. In Republic v. High Court (Fast Track Division), Accra; Ex parte Sian Goldfields Limited [Aurex Management and Investment AG/SA, Interested Party] SCGLR 204 at 209, wherein Anin Yeboah JSC (as he then was) stated:

“We understand the position of the law to be that all adjournments are subject to the Court’s convenience. Trial courts are to exercise discretion in adjourning cases pending before the courts. It is only when an adjournment is refused on illegitimate grounds that an appellate court is bound, in the interest of justice, to interfere. See Mahama v Soli [1976] 2 GLR 99, Heggi v Commonwealth Haulage [1963] 1 glr 276, Buabeng v Forkuo [1970] CC 59 CA.

Again, in Ali Yusif Issa (No. 2) v. The Republic [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 174 at 186, S. Akuffo JSC (as she then was), held:

“Likewise, adjournments are within the sole discretion of the Court and the mere refusal by a Judge to grant the appellant’s application for adjournment cannot, of itself, constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial under Article 1