REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT, SEKONDI & OTHERS
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ADINYIRA (MRS.) JSC (PRESIDING)
- DOTSE JSC
- ANIN YEBOAH JSC
- BAFFOE-BONNIE JSC
- AKAMBA JSC
Areas of Law
- Constitutional Law
- Civil Procedure
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court of Ghana addressed an application to quash a High Court decision that allowed an interlocutory injunction application to proceed, despite the Supreme Court having previously discharged a similar order. The Court emphasized its supervisory jurisdiction over all courts and its authority to issue orders to enforce this jurisdiction. It ruled that allowing the High Court to hear an application based on the same facts as the previously discharged order would undermine the Supreme Court's authority and the administration of justice. Consequently, the Court quashed the relevant part of the High Court's ruling, prohibited the judge from hearing the interlocutory injunction application and the entire case, and directed the Chief Justice to transfer the case to another judge for expeditious hearing. The Court also awarded costs to the Applicant and the 3rd and 4th Interested Parties.
ADINYIRA (MRS) JSC:
On 28th October 2014, this Court discharged an order of interlocutory injunction granted by the High Court Sekondi on 10th April, 2014. Soon after that the 1st and 2nd Interested parties herein on 24th November, 2014 filed another application for mandatory injunction and Interlocutory injunction based on the same facts as in the earlier application.The applicant herein managed to have the trial High Court to set aside the aspect of the application relating to the mandatory injunction as irregular but dismissed the aspect in relation to the interlocutory injunction on the ground that it was properly before him. Counsel argued that the dismissal of the application to set aside the application for interlocutory injunction is an error in law which affects the jurisdiction of the High Court as it undermines the authority of the Supreme Court which had discharged the earlier order. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Interested parties opposed the application on the grounds that the proper procedure for the applicant to adopt was to appeal against the refusal by the High court to set aside the application for interlocutory injunction. Both counsel for the 3rd and 4th Interested parties threw their weight behind the applicant.
Having considered the submissions made before us, as well as the affidavits and exhibits filed in the application, we are of the view that this application be granted. Our reasoning is that, under Article 132 of the 1992 Constitution, the Supreme Court has got supervisory jurisdiction over all courts and authority to issue orders and directions as well, as we did on 28th October, 2014; for purpose of enforcing and securing the enforcement of our supervisory jurisdiction . The order of 28th October discharged the order of interlocutory injunction. Although the circumstances and facts upon which the High Court granted the earlier interlocutory injunction on 10th April 2014 have not changed, yet the 1st and 2nd Interested parties went back to the High Court with an application for the same reliefs based on the same facts. If the High Court judge is not prohibited from hearing the application, it would completely undermine the authority of this Court pursuant to Article 129 (3) of the Constitution; and also undermine the administration of justice.
Accordingly, we will quash the aspect of the ruling of Akrowiah J. dated 10th June 2015 relating to the application for interlocutory injunction. We further prohibit Akrowiah J. from pr