THE REPUBLIC v. THE HIGH COURT (FAST TRACK DIV.) EX PARTE: ANANE AGYEI FORSON

RULING

BENIN, JSC:-

The application has been brought before this court seeking a prohibiting order against the High Court on ground that the said court has no jurisdiction in the matter brought before it by the Attorney-General, Interested Party herein, against a foreign firm called Isofoton SA, represented by a Ghanaian citizen called Anane Agyei Forson. The basis of the claim by the Attorney-General is that this court ordered Isofoton to refund some sums of money that the Government of Ghana had paid to the said Isofoton under a contract which the court had declared void. That judgment was obtained in an action brought against Isofoton and two others by a private Ghanaian citizen named Martin Amidu, a former Attorney-General of Ghana. In order to secure the benefit of that judgment the Attorney-General brought an action by way of a writ of summons at the High Court to recover the sums of money Isofoton was ordered to refund to the Ghana Government.

It is undisputed that the action before the High Court arose out of this court’s judgment in suit number J1/23/2012 intituled:

MARTIN ALAMISI AMIDU

V.

1. ATTORNEY-GENERAL

2. ISOFOTON, SA

3. ANANE-AGYEI FORSON

dated 21st June 2013, unreported. The material part of the said judgment reads: “……..It is consequentially ordered pursuant to article 2(2) of the 1992 Constitution that the 2nd Defendant is to pay or refund to the Government of Ghana the cedi equivalent of US$325,472.00 received from the Government of Ghana and any subsequent payments thereafter made so far pursuant to the contracts declared void by this court.

Interest is to paid on the sum adjudged above from the date of its receipt by the 2nd defendant, in accordance with the Court (Award of Interest and post judgment interest Rules)…..”

The reliefs sought by the Attorney-General at the High Court against Isofoton are exactly the awards made by the Supreme Court in favour of the Government of Ghana in the above quoted judgment. Thus, as rightly pointed out by the High Court in its ruling dismissing an application to set aside the writ of summons, “there is …no doubt that this writ is to enforce the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above.” The High Court concluded that the Attorney-General, plaintiff in the suit before it could maintain the action notwithstanding that it seeks to enforce a judgment of this court.

The applicant could have appealed against the said ruling but instead it chose to invoke this court’s supervisory jur