THE REPUBLIC v. NANA ASEIDU AGYEMANG II & 3 OTHERS, EX PARTE: NANA AMMA FREMPONG AND ANOTHER
July 24, 2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- SAEED K. GYAN
- K. A. ACQUAYE
- MABEL AGYEMANG (MRS)
July 24, 2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
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JUDGMENT
SAEED K. GYAN, J.A
In the case of the Republic v. High Court, Kumasi; Ex Parte Atumfuwa and Another (2000) SCGLR
72, at page 78, Hayfron-Benjamin, JSC affirmed the settled principle of law when he declared as follows:
“The principle, as clearly laid down in civil matters, is that the Plaintiff or applicant must lose where no evidence is led by either party; for, it is the Plaintiff or the applicant who is seeking relief from the Court or tribunal.”
This is obviously in accord with the provisions of the evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). It is however trite that the burden on the prosecution in a criminal matter is so much higher and more onerous.
Thus Section 11 of the Evidence Act, 1975 provides as follows:
For the purposes of this Act, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling on the issue against that party.
In a criminal action, the burden of producing evidence, when it is on the prosecution as to a fact essential to guilt, requires the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that on the totality of the evidence a reasonable mind could find the existence of the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 13(1) of the Evidence Act emphases that: “In a civil or criminal action, the burden of persuasion as to the commission by a party of a crime which is directly in issue requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt”
The matter before this Court is a case of contempt of Court. It is well settled that contempt of Court is in the nature of a quasi criminal action. To establish it in a Court of law one needs to scale the burden and standard of proof to a height beyond reasonable doubt.
Ultimately, the determination of this appeal must rest upon whether or not the Appellants herein did satisfy the burden of proof imposed on them by law, in all the circumstances of the case, to have reasonably weighed on the mind of the trial Court to find for them in respect of the matter or application which they had brought before the trial tribunal for determination.
In the end, the Learned trial judge, sitting at the Nkawkaw High Court, was obviously, not adequately persuaded by the case put up by the Appellants herein and, accordingly, he had no difficulty in dismissing their action against the Respondents herein.
The Appellants, in the due exercise of their statutory rights, have appealed against the decision of the Nkawkaw High Court to this court.
The decision or Ruling of the H
AI Generated Summary
Saeed K. Gyan JA, writing for the Court of Appeal, addressed an appeal from the Nkawkaw High Court’s dismissal of a contempt application arising from a chieftaincy dispute in Kotoso. Appellants Nana Ama Frempomaa and Opanin Thomas Ntim Frimpong alleged a pending petition (KTC/JC/4/2) before the Judicial Committee of the Kwahu Traditional Council and complained that the 1st and 2nd respondents presided over proceedings that led to the swearing/introduction of the 3rd respondent as Kotosohene and recognition of the 4th respondent as Queenmother, thereby undermining the administration of justice. The Court reiterated that contempt is quasi-criminal and demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, and set out the ingredients from R v. Sito I; Ex Parte Fordjour. Appellants failed to tender the alleged petition or show any order forbidding the acts. Applying appellate standards on discretion and C.I.19’s procedural rules (striking out a defective ground), the Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court. Judges K. A. Acquaye and Mabel Agyemang concurred.