SUMANI MUNJI SUBSTITUTED FOR AMORAL MUMUNI
2013
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- WOOD (MRS.) CJ, (PRESIDING)
- DOTSE, JSC
- YEBOAH, JSC
- BENIN, JSC
- AKAMBA, JSC
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
2013
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The case revolves around the jurisdiction of the High Court to extend the time for filing an appeal beyond the statutory period, specifically three years after the original order. The appellant's initial appeal was dismissed as a nullity. The High Court subsequently granted an extension of time which was later vacated as the application was filed beyond the permissive statutory period. The Court of Appeal affirmed that the High Court's order extending the time was null and void due to lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court also affirmed this view, emphasizing the legal principles that a superior court can set aside void orders and the importance of adhering to strict timelines for filing appeals.
J U D G M E N T
WOOD (MRS.), CJ;
This appeal raises such a narrow and uncomplicated question of law; it is difficult to fathom why this court has been invited to intervene. The simple question we have to determine is whether the trial High court which extended the time within which the appellant could file an appeal, some three years after the decision appealed from, had power under its review jurisdiction as provided under Order 42 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 C.I.47 to vacate the said order for want of jurisdiction.
The facts which led to the application for extension of time within which to appeal are these. On the 20th of January, 2003, the appellant lodged an appeal against a decision of the High Court delivered on 13\1\2003. On 26/7/2006, (as we can see over three years after the filing of the appeal) it was thrown out on the preliminary legal ground that it was, on the prevailing facts, a nullity. Subsequently, the appellant, who was anxious to have the appeal determined on the merits, successfully applied to the High Court for an order extending the time within which to file his intended appeal. Aggrieved by the grant, the respondent in turn succeeded in deploying the court’s review jurisdiction to have the order vacated. His argument before the court was that it had acted ultra vires its powers, given that the motion for extension of time was brought well beyond the statutory six month period permitted under the Rule 9 (7) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 C.I.19.
The appeal before us arises from the appellant’s unsuccessful attempt to have the order reversed by the Court of Appeal. We have very little difficulty in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal.
In this court, the appellant restricted the appeal and arguments in support thereof to only one ground, namely:
“That the Court of Appeal erred by holding that the trial judge erred by holding that the trial Judge had no jurisdiction to grant extension of time to Appellant within which to appeal.”
Counsel’s contention is that once the High Court found on the proven facts that they had an appeal pending before the Court of Appeal for three long years before the court struck it out, any delay in applying for extension of time, cannot be attributable to them but the court. My understanding of the argument is that once they have explained the cause of the delay, they were automatically entitled to succeed on their application and the court subsequently erred in vac