REPUBLIC v. KWADWO II
January 17, 1991
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- AMPIAH
- OFORI-BOATENG
- ADJABENG JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Administrative Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
January 17, 1991
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Ofori-Boateng JA, writing for the Court of Appeal, addressed the Republic’s challenge to a High Court acquittal of Nana Osei Kwadwo II, the Omanhene of Bekwai, who had been convicted in the Circuit Court for stealing stool land revenues from Fahiakobo. The judgment recounted Fahiakobo’s status as stool land and the customary payment of an initial "asikano" to the Bekwaihene, contrasted with the State’s contention that all subsequent revenues must be collected and administered by the Administrator of Stool Lands under Act 123 and PNDC L 42. The Court held that Fahiakobo is not exempt from the statutory regime, the respondent’s collections were unlawful and satisfied theft under Act 29 section 120, and his claim of right under section 29 does not bar conviction. It clarified that procedural irregularities are curable under Act 372, dismissed the State’s appeal only as to counts 12 and 13 for lack of evidence, and otherwise allowed the Republic’s appeal, with Ampiah JA and Adjabeng JA concurring.
JUDGMENT OF OFORI-BOATENG J.A.
This is an appeal by the Republic (hereinafter called the appellant) against the decision of the High Court, Kumasi, in favour of Nana Osei Kwadwo II (hereinafter called the respondent)[p.4]. The facts of the case are as follows: The respondent, Nana Osei Kwadwo II, is the Omanhene of Bekwai. Under him is a village called Fahiakobo. Fahiakobo is a stool land and is controlled by an odikro or an agent of the respondent, for ruling or controlling Fahiakobo.
It is the practice in the area that the stranger farmers on the land, pay some money to the respondent and the other "odikro." But with special regard to Fahiakobo the practice as alleged by the appellant is that, whenever any stranger farmer wants land for cultivation he has to consult the Bekwaihene, i.e. the respondent. The respondent will then refer him to the odikro of Fahiakobo, who will demarcate the land to the interested person. Any money paid in consideration of the transfer of the land is called "asikano," and it goes to the benefit of the Bekwaihene in his capacity as the Omanhene. After the "asikano" has been paid the stranger farmer does not have any obligation to pay any other moneys to the Bekwaihene.
The respondent's contention is that with regard to the lands of Fahiakobo, the "asikano" does not mean only the money a stranger farmer pays when he first acquires a part of the Fahiakobo stool lands. It includes all the revenues which accrue from the lands, such as tributes from cocoa farms, rice farms, etc. because of the peculiar history of the Fahiakobo lands. The history is that many years ago a boundary dispute arose between the Dwebisohene and the Twafohene, both being sub-chiefs under the Bekwaihene, the respondent. To avoid a civil war the respondent asked the Ehurenhene to settle the dispute. Each disputant showed his boundary, and when the boundaries were well demarcated, it was noticed that there remained a piece of land not claimed by any of the parties. This piece of land, now known as Fahiakobo was given to the respondent to rule directly. Fahiakobo alone has all the revenues on its lands collected and sent directly to the respondent as the Omanhene. This story appears to be accepted by the appellant.
The contention of the appellant is that the respondent is entitled only to the money which a fresh stranger farmer may pay on acquiring his land. Every other money payable by way of revenue should be paid to the Lands Commission. The State had