REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE QUARCOO
November 25, 1991
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ARCHER C.J. FRANCOIS
- AMUA-SEKYI
- OSEI-HWERE
- EDWARD WIREDU JJ.S.C
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
November 25, 1991
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Per Amua-Sekyi J.S.C. delivering the ruling of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the court addressed an application by an unnamed applicant seeking certiorari to quash a High Court ruling while simultaneously pursuing a substantive suit in the High Court concerning the same matter. After hearing arguments on 29 October 1991 and reserving its ruling, the Supreme Court declined to deliver the reserved ruling immediately. The court considered it unacceptable to maintain parallel proceedings, stressing that such duplication burdens the respondent and risks conflicting outcomes. Relying on Order 59 rule 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) and Paragraph 6 of the Supreme Court’s Practice Direction [1981] G.L.R. 1, S.C., the panel ordered the applicant to discontinue one of the proceedings within four days, warning that failure would result in dismissal and potential punitive costs. The reserved ruling was adjourned to 9 December 1991.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.S.C.
Amua-Sekyi J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. On 29 October 1991 we heard arguments and reserved our ruling for today. We have, however, decided not to give the ruling this morning but instead, to call upon the applicant to discontinue one or the other of the two proceedings which he is pursuing simultaneously in the courts.
It is unacceptable that this application for an order of certiorari to quash a ruling of the High Court should be pursued alongside a substantive suit in the High Court in respect of the same matter. Here, as well as there, his contention is that the ruling of which he complains is null and void, or otherwise irregular. We think that this is to impose an unnecessary burden on the respondent who may have to defend the judgment twice when a decision by this court or the High Court in the respective suits before them ought to conclude the matter one way or the other.
Order 59, r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) enjoins judges of the High Court not to grant leave to apply for an order of certiorari before the time limited for an appeal has expired, or the appeal has been determined. In this way, conflicting decisions are avoided, and finality of judgments assured. In this court, we have time and again refused to entertain applications for orders of certiorari whenever it has come to our notice that the applicant is also seeking relief in another court.
Paragraph 6 of the Practice Direction (Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court) [1981] G.L.R. 1, S.C. issued on 15 June 1981 as Judicial Circular No. 146/12 reads:
"6. It is also to be noted that where a cause or matter can be determined by a superior court, other than the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court shall first be invoked. The Supreme Court may dismiss any such cause or matter, with punitive costs to be paid personally by counsel or by the party responsible for bringing such cause or matter to the Supreme [p.464] Court in the first instance."
In line with this, we order that the applicant do within four days from today file a notice discontinuing the proceedings in this court or the High Court, failing which we shall proceed to dismiss the application and impose the sanctions indicated in paragraph 6 of the Practice Direction (supra). The reserved ruling is adjourned to 9 December 1991.
DECISION
Applicant ordered to file notice of discontinuance either in the High Court or the Supreme C