GH - REPUBLIC v. ASOGLI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND OTHERS; EX PARTE TOGBE AMORNI v. II

JUDGMENT OF ACQUAH J.

This is an application for an extension of time to apply for leave for the writ of certiorari to quash the judgment of the Asogli Traditional Council dated 11 July 1969 and the appellate judgment of the Volta Regional House of Chiefs dated 29 January 1986 in respect of suit No. 2/1968 entitled Ametsitsi v. Kuma alias Togbe Amorni VII.

On 27 May 1991 I dismissed an earlier application by the same applicant for leave to apply for certiorari to quash the said judgments on the grounds that since the judgments sought to be quashed were delivered over six months ago, Order 59, r.3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) forbids such applications unless the applicant obtains extension of time to initiate such application. That application [p.352] was argued by Mr Dogoe on behalf of the applicant’s solicitor, Mr. Adumua-Bossman, who appeared personally on 27 May 1991 to take the ruling.

After the ruling had been read, Mr. Adumua-Bossman indicated that the reason for their not asking for extension of time was that the judgments, in their view, being void and procured in breach of the rules of natural justice, the principle is that there is no time limit in applying to set aside such void judgments. Consequently, their application was not affected by the provisions of the said Order 59, r.3 of L.N. 140A. As an authority for this proposition, counsel relied on Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

It's unfortunate that Mr. Dogoe did not raise this issue in the course of his arguments in that application. Nevertheless, since Mr. Adumua Bossman's submission appears to be generally accepted by a host of legal practitioners and some distinguished jurists, I think it will not be out of place to examine it now with a view to determining its proper scope of operation.

I am aware that Mr. Adumua Bossman's submission has the full support of no less a jurist than his Lordship Abban J.S.C, a judge I have profound respect for. In Republic v. Commissioner for Local Government, Ex parte Nii Amar II [1975] 2 G.L.R. 122, Abban J. (as he then was) had an occasion to consider this submission. The applicant, Nii Amar II, had argued that the orders sought to be quashed being invalid, there was indeed no need for an extension of time to apply for leave under Order 59, r.3 of L.N. 140A. The respondents after submitting that the orders were valid further argued that assuming the decision and orders were null and void, the applicant s

JUDGMENT OF ACQUAH J.

REPUBLIC v. ASOGLI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND OTHERS; EX PARTE TOGBE AMORNI v. II

Areas of Law

JUDGEMENT