REPUBLIC v. ABBEY

JUDGMENT OF AMUAH J.A

The Republic appeals from the decision of Essilfie-Bondzie J. granting an application for an order for extension of time to enable the respondent to apply for an order of certiorari to bring up and quash the conviction and sentence imposed on the respondent on 7 September 1964.

The record of the learned circuit judge reads:

"Case No. 1405/64.

The State

v

Samuel Abbey

First count—Pleaded guilty. Convicted accordingly. Twelve pounds or one month. Second count—Pleaded guilty. Convicted accordingly. One day's imprisonment plus £40 or two months concurrent and non-cummulative R/O."

Both the police and court dockets could not be traced and the respondent did not appeal against his conviction and sentence. In due course he was duly nominated, elected and installed as a paramount chief of Prampram. In 1987 he applied to the Ghana Government for recognition but the government refused to grant him recognition and to publish his particulars in the Local Government Bulletin or the Gazette [p.185] on the ground that he was an ex-convict.

With the view to commencing certiorari proceedings for an order to bring up and quash the conviction, he applied by motion ex parte for leave but failed to obtain such an order because the application was not made within six months of the said conviction or order – see Order 59, r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). Subsequently, he applied under Order 64, r. 6 of L.N. 140A for extension of time to enable him apply for leave and succeeded.

The Republic, dissatisfied with the turn of events, appealed against the said order on the ground that it was unwarranted in law. In arguing the appeal, Mr Sampong, Principal State Attorney, submitted that there had been an excessive delay in commencing certiorari proceedings and that the power of the court to grant extension of time was limited. He referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 37, at p. 32, para 30 and said the court could decline the application where there had been an excessive delay. He submitted that the delay was unreasonable, inexcusable and not bona fide. He further submitted that the respondent, by his affidavit, knew why he was in court on that day and there was no obligation on the part of the court to record facts or indicate that the charge was read and explained in the record.

Mr Adumua-Bossman, learned counsel for the respondent, in reply argued that there was such an obligation under section 171 o