REGINA v. SARPONG
1960
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
- KORSAH C.J.
- VAN LARE J.A.
- GRANVILLE SHARP J.A
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
1960
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The magistrate failed to follow proper procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code in amending the charge from stealing to attempted stealing and not properly informing the appellant of the charges. Consequently, the proceedings were ruled defective and void, leading to the appellants conviction and sentence being quashed. The appellate court decided not to order a retrial, noting insufficient evidence and the appellant's prior custody since conviction. Thus, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant acquitted and discharged.
Van lare, J. A. delivered the judgment of the court. (He referred to facts and continued):
There was in fact no charge of stealing brought against the appellant before the magistrate to warrant any committal proceedings as provided by section 177 of Cap. 10, the charge of stealing in case No. 177/59, having been withdrawn and changed to a charge of attempted stealing in case No. 208/59 upon which the magistrate proceeded.
[p.16]
It appears that the learned magistrate did not proceed under section 177, but attempted to follow the procedure contained in section 176 at the time, as (presumably) it appeared to him that it was undesirable that the case should be tried summarily. The letter section reads as follows:
“Where in the course of the summary trial of an indictable offence it appears to the Court at any stage of the proceedings that the case is one which is of a character which renders it undesirable that it should be tried summarily the Court shall stop further proceedings and expunge the plea and shall thereupon proceed de novo in the manner provided in part V of this Code for enquiring into charges preliminary to committal for trial upon information."
The learned magistrate wholly failed to follow the peremptory direction that he should stop further proceedings, and expunge the plea, before proceeding de novo in the matter. There is, further, nothing in his record to indicate that even the irregularly amended charge of stealing was read over to Sarpong (as required by section 179) before the committal proceedings commenced. Nor is there any note that Sarpong had not been required to make any reply thereto.
The case of R. v. Gee and Others ([1936] 2 K.B. 442) was one in which the justices had failed to follow strictly the provisions of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, which regulated the procedure to be followed by examining justices before committal. Goddard, J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal pointed out that (at p.445) “one of the objects of the Act of 1848 was to standardise the procedure, and it is of the utmost importance that magistrates should understand that there should be strict compliance with the provisions of the Act." The question posed by Goddard, J. was " whether the persons charged had been legally committed for trial." He answered it by stating the opinion of the court as follows (at p.445).
"It appears to the Court that these proceedings were so defective that there was no lawfu