REGINA v. GRUNSHIE
1960
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
- VAN LARE J.A.
- GRANVILLE SHARP J.A.
- SARKODEE-ADOO J
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Evidence Law
1960
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The appellant was found guilty of intentionally causing the death of his wife, Kamuri. His appeal was dismissed, with the court emphasizing that there was no act of provocation, either from adultery or any other form, that could mitigate the offense to manslaughter. The trial judge erred in his summing-up by suggesting that the jury could consider manslaughter, a mistake potentially favoring the appellant. The court affirmed that provocation as a defense requires clear evidentiary support, including direct observation of adultery, which was not present in this case. The interpretations of the relevant statutes and legal principles by the trial judge were found inconsistent with both local and English law.
Van Lare, J.A. delivered the judgment of the court:
On the 26th February, 1960, we dismissed this appeal; we now proceed to give reasons for our judgment. [His Lordship referred to the facts, and continued]: There can be no doubt whatsoever that the appellant intentionally caused the death of his deceased wife Kamuri by lawfully harm, in circumstances amounting to nothing short of brutal murder. He was therefore rightly convicted of that offence.
In dismissing the appeal, however, we wish to draw attention to a question of law arising out of the summing-up which appears to us to have been at fault—not as against the appellant, but rather as going too far in his favour. This is important, because the jury could have been misled by the summing-up to return a verdict of manslaughter, which was not in law open to them. The opinion we have formed of the facts in this case is that no matter of extenuation whatsoever was proved, or could be inferred in law, on behalf of the prisoner. There was no evidence that the deceased (or the other wife of the prisoner) was seen in the act of adultery with Kofi Grunshie on the fatal night. It was not even suggested that Kofi Grunshie was found in any compromising situation with regard to the wives, from which adultery could be inferred. We find ourselves utterly unable to discover any fact from which provocation could legally be drawn, so as to reduce such intentional homicide to manslaughter. That the deceased’s oral abuse of the prisoner could not amount to provocation so as to reduce the killing to manslaughter was a matter of law, upon which it was the duty of the judge to direct the jury. Unfortunately the summing-up was silent in this regard. On the other hand, although there was provocation in connection with adultery, the learned trial judge in his summing-up gave a most elaborate statement of law which, we regret to observe, is not the law on the point either in this country or in England.
“In dealing with provocation as justifying the view that the crime may be manslaughter and not murder, a distinction must be made between what the judge lays down as matter of law, and what the jury decides as a matter of fact. If there is no sufficient material, even on a view of the evidence most favourable to the accused, [p.58] for a jury (which means a reasonable jury) to form the view that a reasonable person so provoked could be driven, through transport of passion and loss of self-control, to the degree and method a