RANSFORD OPOKU & ORS v. LIBHERR FRANCE SAS PAUL JOOST

ATUGUBA, J.S.C:

The appellant had been employed by the 1st respondent as Human Resource Executive. Sometime in February 2009, the appellant who describes himself as a “locked out and victimized whistle blower” brought some police officers to the respondent’s premises, without permission. The 2nd respondent claimed that the appellant threatened him when he asked why the appellant had brought police officers to the premises. The incident was reported to the Airport Police Station and the appellant was invited for questioning. He admitted bringing the police officers but was unable to give any reasons for his conduct. The appellant then proceeded on leave after the incident. Based on the appellant’s conduct, the 1st respondent wrote a letter to the appellant through its managing director terminating his employment. The termination was to take effect on his return from paid leave, on 4th April, 2009.

Meanwhile, the appellant had, while still on leave, filed a suit with six other employees against the respondent. They claimed that the1st respondent had rendered them redundant and were therefore entitled to a redundancy package.

On 3rd April, 2009, the appellant filed a motion on notice for committal for contempt against the 1st and 2nd respondents on the basis that the 2nd respondent had terminated his employment after he had filed a suit for redundancy pay.

The trial judge held, inter alia, that the termination of the Appellant’s employment amounted to contempt as it was intended to frustrate and to prejudice the outcome of the pending suit and bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute. The trial judge ordered the respondents to reinstate the appellant until the final determination of the substantive case. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal unanimously set aside the ruling of the trial court. At page 233 of the record of appeal, the Court of Appeal held that

“…the termination of the employment of the respondent during the pendency of the substantive action in the court below has no bearing at all on the subject-matter of the suit before the trial court.” (e.s).

The appellant filed the instant appeal, pleading 13 grounds. In sum, the appellant herein claims that the Court of Appeal erred when it set aside the ruling of the trial court because it did not fully consider the ramifications of the termination of the appellant’s employment on the appellant’s pending suit against the responden