NOAH EPHRAEM TETTEH ADAMTEY v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL & 14ORs
July 29, 2026
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- BAFFOE-BONNIE, CJ (PRESIDING)
- PWAMANG, JSC
- LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.), JSC
- KULENDI, JSC
- GAEWU, JSC
- DZAMEFE, JSC
- SUURBAAREH, JSC
July 29, 2026
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
Try asking the following...
(a) A declaration that, on a true and proper interpretation of Articles 1(2), 88, 93(2) and 296 of the 1992 Constitution, prosecutorial authority in Ghana is vested exclusively in the Attorney-General and cannot be exercised independently for, or in parallel with, the Attorney-General.
(b) A declaration that the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 459), to the extent that it purports to confer original, autonomous or insulated prosecutorial authority on the Office of the Special Prosecutor, is inconsistent with and in contravention of Articles 1(2), 88(3) and (4), 93(2) and 296 of the Constitution and is therefore null, void and of no effect.
(c) A declaration that sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959, in purporting to make the Office of the Special Prosecutor independent of the AttorneyGeneral in the initiation, conduct and termination of prosecutions, violate the Constitution.
(d) A declaration that Parliament lacks the authority to enact legislation creating a prosecutorial body with powers equivalent to, or independent of, the Attorney-General, absent a constitutional amendment in accordance with Articles 289 and 290.
(e) A declaration that Parliament acted ultra vires its legislative authority under Article 93(2) in purporting, through Act 959, to compel a permanent delegation of the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial powers to the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
(f) A declaration that any statutory delegation of prosecutorial authority made pursuant to Act 959 does not bind subsequent Attorneys-General and lapses upon the assumption of office by a new Attorney-General unless re-authorised by that Attorney-General.
(g) An order striking down or severing the provisions of Act 959 that confer autonomous prosecutorial authority on the Office of the Special Prosecutor or insulate it from the Attorney-General’s constitutional control.
(h) Any further orders or directions that this Honourable Court considers just, equitable and necessary to preserve the integrity of the Constitution and the prosecutorial archit
AI Generated Summary
This original-jurisdiction constitutional suit challenged the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) and the prosecutorial architecture under Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution. The Court, per Chief Justice Baffoe-Bonnie, adopted a purposive, harmonious approach, distinguishing Article 88(3) as a responsibility clause placing exclusive accountability for prosecutions on the Attorney-General and Article 88(4) as the machinery clause permitting prosecutions by persons authorised by him in accordance with law. It held that “person” includes corporate bodies, that Article 88(4) does not prescribe a specific instrument, and that the OSP has been validly authorised via Act 959 and two LIs. Sections 3 and 4 are consistent with the Constitution and do not compel or vary the Attorney-General’s powers. The Attorney-General retains inherent control through nolle prosequi, Article 296(a)-(b) fairness governs his discretion, authorisations do not lapse with a change in office, and all OSP prosecutions and orders since inception are valid.