NANA ADJEI AMPOFO v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL & THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS
July 20, 2011
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- DR. DATE-BAH, JSC (PRESIDING)
- ANSAH, JSC
- ADINYIRA, JSC
- OWUSU, JSC
- DOTSE, JSC
- BONNIE, JSC
July 20, 2011
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
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J U D G M E N T
DR. DATE-BAH JSC:
All members of this Court are agreed on the following judgment. Chieftaincy is a revered and constitutionally entrenched institution in Ghana. The reach of chiefs extends even beyond the formal machinery of the Ghanaian State. Some of the rural settlements or communities without a permanent local resident representative of the Ghanaian State will, almost inevitably, have a chiefly leadership. The social value of the institution of chieftaincy is thus given widespread recognition by the Ghanaian public. Nevertheless the rights of even chiefs are subject to the 1992 Constitution. Indeed, as Coussey JA percipiently observed in Republic v Techiman Traditional Council, Ex parte Tutu [1982-83] GLR 996 at 999:
“Chieftaincy, since the British colonial administration, has been governed by statute and this has continued since the independence of Ghana in 1957.”
Thus, the institution of chieftaincy, although it has evolved in accordance with customary law, has been subjected to regulation by statute since the advent of British colonialism in this jurisdiction. This remains true even now, subject to the qualification that article 270 of the 1992 Constitution limits the extent of statutory intervention permitted in relation to the institution of chieftaincy. This Article 270 provides as follows:
(1) The institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is hereby guaranteed.
(2) Parliament shall have no power to enact any law which-
(a) confers on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief for any purpose whatsoever; or
(b) in any way detracts or derogates from the honour and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.
(3) Nothing in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with, or in contravention of, clause (1) or (2) of this article if the law makes provision for-
(a) the determination, in accordance with the appropriate customary law and usage, by a traditional council, a Regional House of Chiefs or a Chieftaincy Committee of any of them, of the validity of the nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a person as a chief;
(b) a traditional council or a Regional House of Chiefs or the National House of Chiefs to establish and operate a procedure for the registration of chiefs and the public notification in the Gazette or otherwise of the status of persons as chiefs i
AI Generated Summary
In a unanimous Supreme Court judgment authored by Dr. S. K. Date-Bah JSC, a Ghanaian lawyer and former Paramount Chief challenged the constitutionality of offences in section 63 of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759), focusing on subsection 63(d), which criminalizes deliberate refusal to honour a chiefs call. The Attorney-General argued a chiefs call was akin to a subpoena and that chiefs have adjudicatory functions, while the President of the National House of Chiefs urged that traditional incidents of chieftaincy under Article 270(1) justify the provision. The Court held that individual chiefs lack judicial power, a chiefs call is broader than a subpoena, and section 63(d) unjustifiably restricts freedom of movement under Article 21(1)(g). The Court struck down section 63(d), declined the vagueness and overbreadth challenges to 63(d), and rejected the vagueness claims to sections 63(a), (b), (c), and (e). It invited Parliament to redraft a narrower, clearer provision.