MICHAEL ODAI LOMOTEY & ANOR VS KWOW RICHARDSON & ORS

MAJORITY OPINION KULENDI JSC:

INTRODUCTION:

1. We have before us an application, invoking our review jurisdiction pursuant to Article 133 of the Constitution and Rule 54(a) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C. I. 16). The Applicants are praying this Court to review the judgment delivered by the Ordinary Bench of this Court on the 15th of June 2022, and affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision which had settled the issues in contention in favor of the Applicants.

2. Every so often, applications of this nature are brought before this Court, and as we have always maintained, a favorable seizure of this jurisdiction, being the zenith of the judicial process, lends itself only to instances where parties are able to meet the threshold as set by the Constitution, the Rules of this Court and established case law.

Article 133 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana states, ‘The Supreme Court may review any decision made or given by it on such grounds and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by rules of court.

1. The Supreme Court, when reviewing its decisions under this article, shall be constituted by not less than seven Justices of the Supreme Court. ’3. A close examination of this article reveals that it is one of the very few instances in the Constitution where the exercise of a Constitutional prerogative is made subject to ‘such conditions as may be prescribed by the rules of Court. ’ It therefore suggests to us that in the exercise of this Constitutional authority to‘review our decisions’, premium must be placed on the conditions prescribed by the relevant rules of Court.

4. Therefore, to act outside the ambit of these rules in the exercise of our review jurisdiction, no matter how well intentioned, or in pursuit of individual notions of justice, would be unconstitutional and in error.

In this wise, we are guided by the immortal words of Taylor J. (as he then was)in the case of Bonsu v Bonsu [1971] 2 GLR 242 at 260 where he shared the following admonishment, “There is always a real danger when vague ideas of justice undefined by statute or case law are propounded and brandished like a cure-all magic wand- without appreciating the actual position, namely, that the true legal notions of justice are circumscribed by the demands of the law and that in this court we administer justice according to three and only only three yardsticks: statute, case law or our well-defined practice. ”5. Inspired by this erudite restatement of an age old principle, mut