ACKAH-YENSU (MS) JSC
INTRODUCTION
In the matter before us, the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant sought a profound alteration in the trajectory of her professional life by attempting to modify her declared retirement age. As we delve into the judgment, we shall navigate the intricacies of the arguments presented, the legal precedents invoked, and ultimately, the determination of whether such a modification aligns with the established legal framework.
The question for our decision in this appeal therefore is, which of the two lower courts came to the right conclusion on the evidence placed before them in the matter within the context of the relevant applicable law. This is because whereas the trial court accepted the case of the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant on the strength of the evidence before it, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal upon a re-evaluation of the entire record and the applicable law unanimously arrived at their own findings that the trial Judge failed to appreciate that, on the preponderance of the totality of the evidence and the relevant applicable law, the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant who carried the burden of proof had failed to discharge that evidential statutory burden and the law.
In the circumstances, our duty in the determination of this appeal largely depends on our own re-evaluation of the record of appeal and the application of the relevant law by which we should arrive at our own conclusion on the evidence adduced by the parties. This would enable us justify where appropriate an interference with the decision of either of the two lower courts when satisfied from our consideration of the totality of evidence that, one of the verdicts was either unreasonable, perverse, or unsupported by the evidence and the law, such that our appellate interference would be authorized and justified.
It is thus instructive to refer to the decision of this Court in Tuakwa v Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61, a classicus which justifies the interference by this Court in the decisions of lower courts which on the evidence on record and the law we consider inappropriate. In her statement on the law which authorizes the attitude of this Court, Sophia Akuffo, JSC (as she then was), held that: “After reviewing the record, it was therefore our conclusion that on the preponderance of probabilities, the judgment of the trial judge in favour of the Defendant i.e. the Respondent was not supported by the totality of the evidence and the Court of Appeal