JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.
This is an application by E. A. Mahama (who shall hereafter be referred to simply as the applicant) to set aside a default judgment obtained against him on 11 February 1976 in an action commenced by Messrs. Soli and Amadu Seidu (who shall hereafter also be [p.102] referred to simply as the respondents, and where necessary as the first or the second respondent respectively). The application itself is brought under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 36, r. 18, and its propriety is not in issue.
The brief facts of the case which have provoked the application may be stated as follows. On 19 February July 1975, the respondents as shareholders and directors of a limited liability company incorporated in Ghana under the name of Mencilo & Co., Ltd. issued out of this court, an originating motion on notice against the applicant, claiming among other reliefs (a) the removal of the applicant as managing director of the company and (b) an order for accounts of all moneys of the company diverted to the private use of the applicant. Among the allegations complained of are oppressive conduct, misappropriation of the company's funds, mismanagement, establishment of other business concerns by the applicant in competition with the company, conflicts of interest between other business activities of the applicant and the company which he manages, arbitrary use of power and disregard for decisions of the board of directors of the company. Of course in his affidavit opposing the application in the substantive suit, issues were joined on each of these complaints.
On 28 January 1976 when this matter came on for hearing, the applicant requested for an adjournment on the grounds of inability of his counsel to come to court. His application was strongly resisted by learned counsel for the respondents who had come to court with his witnesses and was willing to prosecute his case. In the face of this strong opposition, however, I acceded to the request for the adjournment and made it clear to all concerned that this was the last and final adjournment I was prepared to grant in this matter. The case was therefore adjourned to 10-12 February for definite hearing from day to day.
I think it is pertinent at this stage to mention that prior to the adjournment of 28 January there had been two previous adjournments which had been agreed upon by solicitors for the parties and, on each such occasion, three clear days had been set
