KOFI AMUZU v. THE REPUBLIC
February 27, 2023
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE BERNARD
- BENTIL
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Constitutional Law
February 27, 2023
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
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This is an appeal by the Appellant against the sentence imposed by the trial judge
following the conviction of the Appellant on his own plea of guilty with explanation.
The Appellant, together with one Samuel Kwesi Bekoe (alias One Corner), was
arraigned before the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, on the charges of conspiracy to steal
contrary to sections 23(1) and 124(1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) and
Stealing contrary to section 124(1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29).
The Appellant pleaded guilty with explanation. However, upon listening to the
explanation proffered by the Appellant, the learned trial judge entered a plea of guilty
as the explanation he rendered to the court did not disclose any reasonable defence to
the charges. Thereupon, the trial judge convicted the Appellant on his own plea to a
term of Thirty (30) years imprisonment in hard labour. It is against this sentence that
the instant appeal has been brought.
At page 9 of Record of Appeal, the trial judge stated that:
I have noted that A2 has been so honest with the court by pleading guilty and
providing honest explanation. I have also noted that A2 was convicted and sentenced
from this very court on a similar offence. I have also noted that section 296(5) gives
the maximum imprisonment sentence as 25 years and because A2 is known he is to
serve twice the maximum imprisonment. However, for A2’s honesty, the court hereby
sentence A2 to thirty years IHL for count one and thirty years IHL for count two.
Sentence to run concurrently.
It is trite learning that sentencing is widely at the discretion of the court. However, the
exercise of this discretion must not be arbitrary, capricious or bias. (See Article 296 of
the 1992 Constitution). The discretion in imposing a sentence is not unlimited and
should be exercised within the statutory limits imposed on the court.
Sentencing may only be interfered with where it is shown that the trial court acted on
wrong principles or that the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Thus, where the sentence imposed by the trial judge is well within the maximum
prescribed by law, an appellate court may not disturb same merely because it would
have given a lighter sentence if it had tried the case at first instance.
See BANDA V THE REPUBLIC [1975] 1 GLR 52; FRANCIS ARTHUR V THE
REPUBLIC (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: H2/09/2018) DATED 21 FEBRUARY, 2019
(DELIVERED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL).
Suffice it to say that, no judge has juris
AI Generated Summary
In this sentencing appeal from the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, the Appellant, who pleaded guilty with explanation to conspiracy to steal and stealing alongside Samuel Kwesi Bekoe (alias One Corner), challenged a thirty-year term of imprisonment imposed by the trial judge. The Circuit Court judge justified the enhanced sentence by misreading section 296(5) of Act 30 as permitting twice the maximum because the Appellant was a “known” offender, while acknowledging his honesty. On appeal, High Court Judge Bernard Bentil emphasized that sentencing discretion is bounded by Article 296 and statutory limits and that appellate intervention is warranted for wrong principles or manifestly excessive sentences. Citing Banda v The Republic and Francis Arthur v The Republic, the court concluded a sentence exceeding the twenty-five-year maximum under section 124 of Act 29 is illegal, set aside the thirty-year term, and reduced the sentence to five years in light of the Appellant’s remorse and guilty plea.