KABRE v. THE STATE
1966
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- OLLENNU
- AZU CRABBE
- LASSEY JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
1966
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The appellant was initially convicted for the murder of his step-son, with evidence provided by witnesses and medical testimony suggesting he might suffer from schizophrenia. The trial judge's directions to the jury on insanity were found to be insufficient and misleading, particularly regarding the relevance of motive. The appeal court determined that the appellant was legally insane at the time of the act and substituted the initial guilty verdict with a special verdict of 'guilty but insane.' The appellant was ordered to be detained at a mental hospital.
JUDGMENT OF AZU CRABBE J.A.
Azu Crabbe J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant was convicted by a jury before Sowah J. sitting at Ho on 17 November 1965, for the murder of one Kwasi Kabre at Lekorkor in the Volta Region on 12 October 1964.
The deceased, a boy of between nine and ten years old, lived with his mother and the appellant, together with two other sisters, in the said Lekorkor cottage at a village called Baika. The deceased was the step-son of the appellant, but the appellant regarded him as his real son. Almost all those who lived in the same village with the appellant thought, in view of the appellant's affection and care for the deceased, that the deceased was the real son of the appellant. The deceased invariably accompanied the appellant to the farm to help. No one knew of any quarrel between the appellant and his wife, and the evidence was that the appellant and his family lived happily together.
On the morning of that fateful day when the killing took place, the appellant had invited nearly twenty persons to help him in splitting his cocoa. Among the helpers was one Kariwa Kabre (the first prosecution witness) and his wife Akosua Kabre, who remained with the appellant after all the others had left at about 3 p.m. for their own villages. No one heard of any quarrel during the splitting of the cocoa. At a certain moment the second prosecution witness who was in a kitchen said that when she came out she saw the deceased lying down with a wound at the back of his neck. The appellant was standing near the deceased holding a cutlass which was dripping with blood. The second prosecution witness said that she raised an alarm, and this attracted the attention of the first prosecution witness who was still working on the cocoa. The first prosecution witness said that [p.772] he tried to get near the appellant, but the appellant said to him that if he (the first prosecution witness) advanced further towards him (the appellant) he would cut him (the first prosecution witness) with the cutlass. The first prosecution witness said that he ran away, and that when he later returned to the scene of the killing with other people the appellant had disappeared. This is how the first prosecution witness summed up the appellant's reaction to the killing, "When I saw the accused standing above the child he stood very quiet. He stood gazing at the child.” There was no motive for this killing, and no one could suggest any. Indeed, it is impossi