1960
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This case involves an application to restore an appeal that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that there is no rule in its Rules of Court that would permit such a restoration. The Court rejected the argument that section 13 of the Courts Act, 1960, had retrospective effect, holding that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless it is very clearly stated or implied. The application was therefore dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF GRANVILLE SHARP J.S.C.
Granville Sharp, J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court: This is an application by way of motion to the court to restore to the list for hearing an appeal to the Court of Appeal which was on the 11th April, 1960 dismissed on the grounds that, as the law then stood, the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain it. No appeal from this decision was lodged with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and no more was heard of it until the 10th November, 1960 when this motion was filed in the Supreme Court.
The grounds on which the application is made are in reality immaterial because Dr. Danquah, for the applicants, has felt himself compelled to admit that there does not exist in the Rules of the Supreme Court, any rule empowering the court to restore to the list an appeal which, after full and open hearing, has been dismissed.
There are cases in which an appeal or a motion which has been dismissed or struck out may be restored to the list for hearing and these are provided for in the rules. This case however is not one of them.
In the circumstances Dr. Danquah sought refuge in section 13 of the Courts Act, 1960 which re-enacts section 8 of the former Court of Appeal Ordinance No. 35 of 1957. The section is as follows: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other provision of this Act, the Supreme Court may entertain any appeal from any Court on any terms which it may think just."
First however he contended that the Courts Act, 1960 must by necessary implication be given retrospective effect and that the legislature must be deemed to have intended that cases which before 1st July, 1960 had been dismissed for want of jurisdiction under the then existing law should be revived.
The rule of interpretation was stated in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes 11th ed. p. 204 and is as follows: "No statute shall be construed to have restrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication." In the present instance the Act, which has the effect of curing a defect in the law by enlarging the jurisdiction of this court contains no clear indication that it is intended to have retrospective operation. Indeed in two respects at least it evinces a wholly contrary intention. In section 157 it is provided that the Act "shall come into operation at the same time as the Constitution"; that is to say, 1st July, 1960.
[p.269]