IN RE ARMAH (DECD); ARMAH v. ARMAH

JUDGMENT OF ADJABENG J.

The plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) is the only child of Wallace Amako Cofie Armah who died intestate in Accra on 5 December 1980. The defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) is the widow of the said deceased and the stepmother of the appellant. The respondent had been married under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap 127 (1951 Rev). on or about 23 June 1986 the appellant applied for letters of administration to administer the estate of his late father. The respondent caveated. As the parties had failed to come to an agreement as to who should be granted the letters of administration,'the High Court, Accra acting under Order 60, r 21(2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), ordered that the appellant should issue a writ of summons for the determination of the issue. He did.

At the trial of the action the court was called upon to determine not only the main issue of who should be granted the letters of administration, but also two other very important issues. These are whether or not the deceased died possessed of only one house - or two houses, and also whether or not the law applicable to the distribution of the deceased's properties is the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (PNDCL 111) or Cap 127. The trial judge decided that the deceased died possessed of only one house and not two. She also decided that it was PNDCL 111 which should be applied in the distribution of the deceased's properties. In respect of the main issue, the judge decided that in view of "the bitter feud between the parties, the unhealthy rivalry characterised by accusations and counter accusations," she would not make a grant to either of them. The trial judge felt that a neutral person would be more appropriate in the circumstances, and so appointed the Administrator-General to do the job. The appellant was dissatisfied and accordingly appealed to this court against the decision.

Three grounds of appeal were argued on behalf of the appellant. These are, firstly, that the trial judge erred in law in applying the Provisions of PNDCL 111 to the devolution and distribution of the estate of the late W A C Armah who died intestate on 5 December 1980. Secondly, that the judge erred in law and in fact in deciding that the two buildings which the late W A C Armah died possessed of were or constituted one house in his estate in terms of Section 4(a) of PNDCL 111 instead of two houses in terms of sectio