J U D G M E N T.
GBADEGBE JSC:
We begin this delivery with the statement that this case is in our opinion another example of how simple fact situations in the dealings between blood relations often end up in the courts requiring pronouncements that involve important questions of law. In our view although this is a vindication of the capacity of the legal system to order our lives, it would have been preferable if the action herein had been resolved through ADR. We must express our regret that such determinations have the effect of impacting negatively on the future relationship of the parties. Now to the facts on which this case turns.
Following the death of a person to whom we shall conveniently in this judgment refer to as B, and in the course of the distribution of his estate a building situate in Tamale that was being utilized as a hotel (the property) was allotted to the plaintiff herein and her daughter as well as four other persons. The beneficiaries and those who were responsible for the distribution of B’s estate who from the evidence were not appointed by the court either as executors or administrators without a will annexed reached an agreement that if any of the beneficiaries was willing to buy the property it would be sold to him at an agreed price. We believe that this arrangement must have been intended to secure some financial provision for the beneficiaries by way of a lump sum payment and observe that before us nothing of consequence arises from it.
The admitted evidence discloses that the plaintiff offered to buy the property, a decision which meant that she had to buy off the interests of the other four beneficiaries amounting to two thirds of the one hundred thousand cedis. As she was not able on her own to raise the purchase price of the property, she approached the first defendant, her uterine sister to assist her in buying off the interest of the four beneficiaries. It appears that although the sister initially agreed, she resiled therefrom and had to be persuaded so to do by members of her family including her mother and indeed her husband. When subsequently she paid up the purchase price, she claimed she did so because the plaintiff had agreed with her that in relation to the quantum of her contribution which was two thirds of the value of the property, she was to hold two thirds of the interest in the property while the plaintiff and her infant child took the remaining one third.
After the payment for the property, the plain